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I. INTRODUCTION: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES
On May 21, 1997, the United Nations approved and opened for
signature the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses ("Convention").'
On one level, if the

Convention ever comes into force and is adopted by the United States, it
will not have a substantial impact on the use of our international bodies of
water. 2 Article 3 of the Convention provides that "nothing in the present

Convention shall affect the rights or obligations of a watercourse State
arising" from prior agreements; the article only expresses the hope that
countries will "consider harmonizing" pre-existing treaties with the

Convention.3 Thus, the Convention is subordinate to existing allocation
treaties. Our shared waters with Canada and Mexico are subject to several

well-developed treaty regimes. Separate treaties govern the Columbia, the
Colorado, and the Rio Grande Rivers between the United States and

Canada or Mexico. The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 regulates the use
of the Great Lakes, the Saint Lawrence River, and other Canada-United

States boundary waters and their tributaries. 4
On another level, however, the Convention could have two significant
impacts on existing treaty regimes. Like many international agreements,
the principles of the Convention reflect established or emerging customary
international law.
Thus, the Convention may influence: (1) the

interpretation of existing treaties5 and (2) the substance and structure of
supplemental agreements to adjust to new uses.6
This article examines the possible influence of the Convention on the

1. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 [hereinafter International Watercourses Convention].
2. For a pessimistic assessment of the future of the Convention, see Lucius Caflisch,
Regulation of the Uses of International Waterways: The Contributionof the United Nations,
in THE UNITED NATIONS AT WORK 3 (Martin Ira Glassner ed., 1998).
3. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(3), 36 I.L.M. at 704
(permitting countries to modify the International Watercourses Convention in subsequent
agreements).
4. Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11,
1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 36 Stat. 2448. The treaty does not apply equally to all the Great
Lakes. Technically, Lake Michigan is a tributary water rather than a boundary water since
it is the only Great Lake wholly within the United States. However, the consistent practice
of the two nations is to treat Lake Michigan as part of the boundary water system. See
Richard B. Bilder, Controlling Great Lakes Pollution: A Study in United States-Canadian
Environmental Cooperation, 70 MICH. L. REV. 469, 482 (1972).
5. Stephen C. McCaffrey, An Overview of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Non-Navigational Use of International Watercourses (1999 paper prepared for the
Third Annual International Water Law Seminar, Securing Water Rights and Managing
Water Scarcity: Law and Policy in Practice, hosted by the Water Law & Policy
Programme, University of Dundee, Scotland). See also Stephen C. McCaffrey & Mpazi
Sinjela, The 1997 United Nations Convention on International Watercourses, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 97, 106 (1998).
6. See David J. Lazerwitz, The Flow of International Water Law: The International
Law Comnission's Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 247 (1993).

Issue 2

SAFEGUARDING INT'L RIVER ECOSYSTEMS

United States' shared international rivers and lakes by focusing on the
emerging relationship between international water law and the protection of
riverine and coastal ecosystems through adaptive management regimes.
This article accomplishes two things: (1) it places the relationship in the
context of the worldwide debate regarding the function of watercourses;
and (2) it uses the growing concern over the degradation of Colorado River
Delta as a case study to explore the possible application of the Convention
to an existing international water allocation regime.
II. INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: COMPETING VISIONS
The Convention was adopted as the function of international water law
expands and changes, reflecting two competing visions of water use:
The
multiple-use and ecosystem conservation and management.
grundnorm of international water law posits that the use of international
water bodies be shared among riparian and littoral states. 7 A relatively
sophisticated but undeveloped and untested international law regime is
evolving to provide the ground rules for shared use. This emerging regime
is a major restraint on selfish assertions of state sovereignty and a is
positive step toward the peaceful settlement of water disputes. 8 However,
this regime makes two crucial assumptions that are increasingly at variance
with the rapidly emerging concept of environmentally sustainable resource
use and management which seeks to balance the maintenance of flows
required to perform the necessary ecosystem services with the support of
traditional consumptive and non-consumptive uses. 9 International water
use law assumes that international rivers will be used primarily for carryover storage and consumptive use and that the major constraint on
consumptive use is the duty not to cause substantial transboundary
pollution.0
International water law currently plays a limited role in striking a
balance between the two visions of multiple-use and ecosystem
conservation and management for many reasons. The principle reason for
the current limited use of international water law is that the allocation rules
are so open-ended that, at best, international water law provides only a
The role of law in
procedural framework for dispute resolution. 1
7. This principle is consistent with the modern characterization of international law as a
system to promote distributive justice to scarce resources among the international
community. In his seminal book, Thomas M. Franck describes the Convention as an effort
"to provide for distribution of a scarce resource through the application of broadly
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
conceived equity."
INSTITUTIONS 74 (1995).
8. See DANIEL HILLEL, RIVERS OF EDEN: THE STRUGGLE FOR WATER AND TH4E QUEST
FOR PEACE INTHE MIDDLE EAST (1994) (examining a water dispute that many predict could
lead to a war).
9. The utility of sustainable development as a resource management principle remains
contested. See, e.g., TOWARD SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES (Daniel A. Mazmanian &
Michael E. Kraft eds., 1999). However, in the past two decades, no alternative principle
has emerged to supplant sustainable development.
10. See infra notes 11-12.
11. Richard Kyle Paisley & Timothy L. McDaniels, hIternational Water Law,
Acceptable Pollution Risk and the Tatshenshini River, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 111, 122-23

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 3

international water allocation is inherently marginal 12 because stronger
incentives for nations to assert exclusive incompatible claims rather than to
seek shared solutions often exist. In this environment, ecosystem integrity
remains subordinate to optimum use. However, some signs indicate that
environmentally based river management will increasingly become equally
as important as mass allocations among riparian states. At a minimum, the
Convention reinforces powerful changes in our perception of the function
of river systems.
The dominant water use vision of the twentieth century sought to
develop and manage large rivers to promote the "optimum" development
of these systems. Under this vision, the flow of large river systems has
been perceived as a natural resource or "commodity" which should be
extensively developed to benefit those living in or outside the basin.13
Scientific conservation' 4 provides the basis for this vision, positing that the
entire river system should be intensively developed and managed to
maximize economic potential through large-scale, multiple-use projects. 5
After World War II, the idea of multiple purpose regional water
development was exported to the developing world,' 6 influencing
international water law. The traditional vision of a river system as a
commodity for use to the maximum extent possible remains the dominant
vision worldwide. While the traditional vision is alive and well in the
People's Republic of China and many other parts of the developing world,
developed and developing countries increasingly question the traditional
vision.
Scientific conservation provided the intellectual foundation for massive

(1995).
12. Any legal system, especially the international legal system, "represents a kind of
regulatory commons, where effective action is dependent upon alliances of groups
overcoming collective action barriers and pressuring administrators to respond." Thomas
W. Merrill, Golden Rules For Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 985 (1997).
But see Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The
Challenges of International Water Resources Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 384, 392-94 (1996).
13. One of the principle themes of modern environmental history is the influence of
Western European law and economic theory on the perception of all resources as
commodities. See, e.g., WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE'S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE
GREAT WEST

(1991).

14. In a previous article, I explored the intellectual origins of scientific conservation and
its influence on domestic and international law. See A. Dan Tarlock, International Water
Law and the Protection of River System Ecosystem Integrity, 10 BYU. J. OF PUB. L. 181
(1996).
15. The theory that water projects yield large economic developments has always been
more of an article of faith among politicians and water managers rather than a rigorously
empirically verified hypothesis. One of the leading students of multiple purpose planning,
Irving K. Fox, characterized the debate as one between economic rationality, which
emphasized reallocation and conservation, and the development model, which saw water as
the engine of perpetual economic growth. See Irving K. Fox, Policy Problems in the Field
of Water Resources, in WATER RESEARCH 271 (Allen V. Kneese & Stephen C. Smith eds.,
1965); see also W.R. Derrick Sewell, The Changing Content of Water Resources Planning:
7he Next Twenty-five Years, in WATER IN A DEVELOPING WORLD: THE MANAGEMENT OF A
CRITICAL RESOURCE

16.

BRUCE RICH,

57 (Albert E. Utton & Ludwik Teclaff eds., 1978).
MORTGAGING THE EARTH:

IMPOVERISHMENT, AND THE CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT

THE WORLD BANK,

224-39 (1994).
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worldwide, large-scale water development. However, it is now recognized
that this development facilitated the destruction of the ecological integrity
of many large river systems and their floodplains by allowing nations to
alter the natural flow of rivers through dams, diversion systems, and flood
control projects. Thus, in the past two decades, the law has reevaluated
the benefits of multiple purpose development and we are now beginning to
calculate the high social and environmental costs of maximum
development. In brief, the argument is that many multiple-use projects
represent an inefficient allocation of resources, cause environmental
degradation, and are often socially inequitable. 7
In the United States, the costs of multiple purpose development were
primarily environmental and fiscal, although some Native American tribes
suffered the loss of tribal lands. The emphasis on supply augmentation
foreclosed the consideration of less environmentally destructive
alternatives, such as water markets, demand management, 8 and adaptive
management, to meet demand. In the developing world, the costs are
environmental, fiscal, and social. Foreign driven projects often have
Due to the
devastating impacts on local subsistence economies. 9
international environmental and human rights movements, the idea that
regional multiple purpose river projects will provide economic
development has been challenged. Developing countries have opposed
dam projects because they displace minority populations, inequitably
distribute water, and often fail to deliver the promised economic benefits. 2 °
For example, throughout the world, structural flood control measures are
often self-defeating. Structural flood control measures destroy natural
flood control landscapes such as wetlands and create a moral hazard.21
Dams, levees, flood insurance, and generous disaster relief programs
inefficiently encourage people to assume the risks of floodplain
development.
The process of "environmental accounting" has recently led to a more
radical ecological ideal of the function of river systems and their
The newer ecological integrity vision is less clearly
floodplains 2
articulated than multiple-use because it rests on a more complex view of
17.

See

DAVID LEWIS FELDMAN, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: IN SEARCH OF AN

ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC (1991).
18. See SANDRA POSTEL, LAST OASIS: FACING WATER SCARCITY 165-82 (Worldwatch

Envtl. Alert Series) (Linda Stark ed., 1997).
19. See W.M. ADAMS, WASTING THE RAIN: RIVERS, PEOPLE AND PLANNING IN AFRICA
(1992).
20. See RICH, supra note 16; see also THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF
A recent United Nations
LARGE DAMS (Edward Goldsmith, et al. eds., 1984).
Development Programme study concludes dams and diversions have extripated or put at risk
20% of the world's freshwater fish. People and Ecosystems: The Fraying Web of Life.
< http://wri.org/wri.org/wri/wrr2000 >.
21. INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. REV. COMM., ADMINISTRATION FLOODPLAIN
MGMT. TASK FORCE, SHARING THE CHALLENGES: FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT INTO THE 21ST

CENTURY 142-43 (1994).

22. Professor Ludwik A. Teclaff is one of the leading advocates of the need to recognize
the benefits of historic flood patterns as well as the benefits of flood control. See Ludwik
A. Teclaff, Treaty Practice Relating to Transboundary Flooding, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J.
109, 115-18 (1991); LUDWIK A. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW (1967).
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the human role in the functioning of natural systems.23 The ecological
integrity vision sees river systems as dynamic, ever-changing, functioning
ecosystems which serve a variety of functions from the maintenance of
consumptive uses to the maintenance of the historic natural "services" of
rivers. The new vision is not a simple river preservation concept because
it will be realized, if at all, within the framework of environmentally
sustainable use and development.24 River use must always accommodate a
sustainable, non-wasteful level of consumptive use.25 International water

law also potentially includes a justice component.

In exercising their

claimed international right to develop, individuals and defined groups may
have a right to a minimum amount of 26non-polluted water for human
consumption and sustainable development.

The newer "river-as-ecosystem" concept starts with the premise that
we must try to integrate human uses of a river system with the maintenance
of natural environmental sustainability 27 both in the design of new projects
and in the re-engineering and operation of existing facilities.28 A recent,
precedent setting report on Middle East water use concluded "maintaining

and enhancing ecosystem goods and services is essential for the economic
development and welfare" of the region especially over the "medium and
longer terms.

" 29

A prime example of ecosystem services is the

maintenance of fresh/salt water balances in the deltas and estuaries of the
great rivers of the world.
The baseline, or norm, is the historic
hydrographic of the river and the functions sustained by the flow of the
river over time.3" These functions include the maintenance of natural

systems, such as wetlands, and human economies.

Consistent with this

23. See DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1990).
24. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENEATIONAL EQUITY 238-45 (1989).
25.

See

WESTERN WATER POL'Y REV.

CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 3-1

ADVISORY COMM'N,

WATER IN THE WEST:

to 3-3 (1998) (endorsing the concept of

sustainable consumptive use).
26. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International
Implications, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1993).
27. For a helpful introduction to modern ecology and its influence on environmental
management for attorneys, see Judy L. Meyer, Changing Concepts of System Management,
in SUSTAINING OUR WATER RESOURCES 78, 80-88 (1992) (Water Sci. & Tech. Bd. Tenth
Anniversary Symp.); Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts it Ecology, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875 (1994); see also A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in
Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1121
(1994). See generally REED F. Noss & ALLEN Y. COOPERIDER, SAVING NATURE'S LEGACY:
PROTECTING AND RESTORING BIODIVERSITY 46 (1994) (arguing that changes in
environmental management build on the substitution of a non-equilibrium for an equilibrium
paradigm in ecology).
28. See supra notes 22-25.
29. COMMITTEE ON SUSTAINABLE WATER SUPPLIES FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, WATER FOR
THE FUTURE: THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP, ISRAEL, AND JORDAN 66 (1999).
30. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Missouri River: The Paradox of Conflict Without Scarcity,
2 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 11-12 (1997); A. Dan Tarlock, River Management
in the Twenty-first Century: The Vision Thing, 6 RIVERS 43, 45, 48 (1997). For a specific
application of this concept to a major international river, see Independent Sci. Group,
Return to the River: An Ecological Vision for the Recovery of the Columbia River Salmon,
28 ENVTL. L. 503 (1998).
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analysis, Hungary, Croatia, and Yugoslavia have agreed to create a joint
wetlands nature reserve where the Drava and Danube Rivers meet as "part
of a broader effort to rethink the management of Europe's rivers . . . to
return to a more natural approach."'
In addition, the flow cycle of the
pre-Aswan Dam Nile River is the classic example of the ecological-social
vision, 32 while the post-dam river is a prime example of the commodity
vision.
III. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EQUITABLE UTILIZATION
Equitable utilization of shared, scarce resources is the fundamental
principle of international water law. The concept is derived largely from
United States water law and is designed primarily to promote fair
development opportunities among all riparian states. However, recent
international efforts to restate and reform international water law, by
addressing existing and potential environmental degradation, have
supplemented the objective of promoting fair development.
The
Convention remains primarily an allocation framework and is both
progressive and regressive compared to other formulations of rules. The
Convention attempts to incorporate more environmentally sensitive rules
compared to past international water law principles.3 3 While this is a
positive step, the additional principles that encourage aquatic ecosystem
management must supplement the emerging allocation rules. Because the
Convention incorporates a number of international environmental rules, it
can be the starting point for the development of an international law of
riverine ecosystem management.
A. THE UNITED STATES MODEL: RIVERS AS COMMODITIES

United States water law serves as the principal model for international
water law.34 Interstate rivers vein throughout America and many interstate
and inter-basin conflicts have arisen. In the United States' federal system,
states cannot wage war on each other.35 Interstate disputes must be solved
either by the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court, quasi-treaties, or congressional interstate compacts.36

31. Marlise Simons, Where War Roiled Danube, Nature is Peacemaker, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1999, at A4.
32. Nile River irrigation began to be modified in the nineteenth century. Barrages and
dams were constructed to regulate the Nile's flow, but historic patterns were relatively
maintained until the construction of the High Aswan Dam. See H.E. HURST, THE NILE: A
GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE RIVER AND THE UTILIZATION OF ITS WATERS (1957).
33. See International Law Comm'n, The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (1992).
34. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revised, Updated, and
Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381 (1984).
35. In 1934, Arizona's governor ordered a unit of the state National Guard to occupy
the Parker Dam construction site to prevent the Department of the Interior from carrying
out a contract with the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, but the mini-war
did not prevent the dam. Jack L. August, Jr., THE VISION INTHE DESERT: CARL HAYDEN
AND HYDROPOLITICS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 146-48 (1999).
36. Id. at 382-84.
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Principles of federalism and international law establish a rule of interstate
entitlements. 37 The principle of equitable apportionment between basins

and states is the basis for interstate water law.
Equitable apportionment is an adaptation of the two major legal
systems in force in the United States: the common law of riparian rights
and the doctrine of prior appropriation, which applies in the arid regions.39
United States water law can be explained as an effort to remove legal
barriers to maximum or multiple-use and to allow the creation of

individual, correlative property rights in water to the maximum extent

possible.4" For example, in the Western United States, prior appropriation

promotes multiple-use by recognizing a relatively firm property right to
store and consume as much of the natural flow as possible and to use water
outside the watershed. The powerful rule of prior appropriation developed
on small streams to support hydraulic mining, but was projected on

progressively large geographic scales.41
Equitable apportionment promoted multiple purpose development by
projecting the principle that prior uses required protection unless

compelling, competing considerations existed across state lines.

This

principle both protected vested rights and encouraged states to quantify
their future claims through interstate compacts to enable federally financed
regional water development. In the early twentieth century, the United

States Supreme Court ("Court") adjudicated water use disputes across state
lines pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Upstream withdrawals along the
Arkansas River in Colorado reduced available supplies downstream in

Kansas.42 In the Midwestern United States, the reversal of the flow of the

Chicago River caused pollution to be discharged by the city of Chicago
into the Mississippi River and triggered a lawsuit by Missouri.43 The state
alleged that Chicago's discharge contributed to a typhoid epidemic in Saint
Louis. 44 The Missouri and Kansas lawsuits required the Court to develop a
law of interstate water use.
The result was the law of equitable
37. Id. at 402-03.
38. Id. at 394-95.
39. Id. at 384.
40. Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., of the Colorado Supreme Court, characterized the
purpose of the beneficial use requirement in western water law as the advancement of "the
fundamental principles of Colorado and western water law that favor optimum use, efficient
water management, and priority administration, and disfavor speculation and waste." Santa
Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54 (Colo. 1999).
41. See A. Dan Tarlock, From Natural Scarcity to Artificial Abundance: The Legacy of
California Water Law and Politics, 1 WEST-NORTHWEST 71, 75-84 (1994) (providing a
history of the role that prior appropriation played in the development of California).
42. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1906). The litigation continued, in one form or
another, for over a century, and Kansas eventually prevailed against Colorado after losing
two original jurisdiction actions. In 1947, the states negotiated an interstate compact. In
1985, Kansas brought an original action to enforce the compact, claiming that Colorado
exceeded its compact share. In 1995, the Court upheld the Special Master's finding that
post compact high capacity wells in Colorado caused material depletion in useable river
flows in Kansas in violation of the Arkansas River Compact, Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S.
673, 680 (1995), and remanded the case for a trial to determine Kansas's remedies. Id.
43. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 497 (1906).
44. Id. at 503.
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apportionment to resolve interstate conflicts. The Court initially looked to
the classic rule of international law that all states have equal legal rights to
fashion the principle of equitable apportionment 45 because all riparian states
are of equal dignity.
In the United States federal system, states are only quasi-sovereign.
Thus, it was possible for the Court to hold that the use of common
resources, such as interstate streams and groundwater basins, must be
shared among co-riparian states. Formally, the Court has developed a
"flexible doctrine" for apportionment that balances the need to
accommodate new uses with the protection of existing economies.4 6 The
open-ended equitable apportionment formula applied by the Court purports
to weigh the comparative merits of different river uses over a long period
of time. In reality, the Court consistently has rewarded early development
by protecting prior uses against subsequent uses. In 1982, the Court
suggested that it would not protect an inefficient existing use to permit a
new and more efficient use of the water when "reasonable conservation
measures [by existing users] can offset the reduction in supply due to
diversion."47 Two years later it recanted this heresy and preserved the
priority of a small reclamation district, leaving open the possibility,
however, that a new diversion could displace an existing one if the state
made a strong showing that an immediate demand for a highly valued use
existed.4"
Unless states agree to an interstate compact that guarantees future
shares to slower developing states, equitable apportionment often
contributes to the degradation of large river systems by stimulating a raceto-develop.
The bias against conservation and the displacement of
inefficient uses makes protection of flow rates difficult. Thus, in prior
appropriation states, equitable apportionment has not protected instream
flows. Eastern, or "humid" states, better protect instream flows because
the Court generally follows the law of the states in which the conflict
arises. Thus, in common law or riparian rights states, the flow can be
often protected if it is being "used." For example, the Court has protected
the ecological integrity of the Great Lakes system by substantially limiting
out of basin diversions to protect pre-existing navigation uses.49 The Court
has also prevented diversions that might impair the waste assimilative
capacities of a river."
The recent attempts to claim instream flows on the Platte River
illustrate the resistance of the law of equitable apportionment to new
management concepts. In the 1930s, the Court adjudicated rights to the
North Platte River between Nebraska and Wyoming users. 5
Nebraska
reopened the decree in the 1980s to protest some new diversions by
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Kansas, 206 U.S. at 97.
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982).
Id. at 190.
Colorado v. New Mexico II, 467 U.S. 310, 323-24 (1984).
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 419-20 (1929).

50. New Jersey v. New York, 282 U.S. 336, 346-47 (1931).
51.

Nebraska v. Wyoming I, 325 U.S. 589, 656-57 (1945).
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Wyoming. 2 The first decision in the reopened decree litigation did not
address environmental issues.53 Fortunately, the Court's opinion does not
preclude environmental management of the Platte; it only renders it less
legally secure. The three basin states, Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming,
subsequently signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the Secretary of
the Interior and developed a basin-wide wildlife protection plan resulting in
the emergence of a multi-jurisdiction management regime which includes

flow augmentation, foregoes new projects, and modifies existing projects

to increase storage. 54 However, the fact remains that no public or private
entity can claim rights to a wildlife protection flow under the equitable

apportionment doctrine.55

B. MODERN INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: EQUALITY AMONG STATES
AND BASINS

Modern international water law starts with the assumption that all
states whose territories contribute to an international drainage basin have a
right to an equitable share, which includes a right to a fair development
opportunity of the waters of the basin.5 6 All nations must adjust their use
to accommodate the needs of other states because sovereignty is not a basis

to withhold resources from downstream states or to prevent upstream states

from using their fair share of the resource. This remains the core-and
only certain-principle of international water law.
The doctrine of equitable utilization participation is a rule of customary
international law.57 The equitable utilization participation principle was
adopted prior to the rise of the worldwide environmental movement in the
late 1960s and has been reaffirmed in subsequent non-binding declarations

such as the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment
("1972 Stockholm Conference"), 58 the 1977 World Water Conference in
Mar del Plata, 59 the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and

Development in Rio de Janeiro ("Rio Declaration"), 60 and most recently in
52. Nebraska v. Wyoming II, 507 U.S. 584, 587 (1993).
53. See id.
54. Margaret Zallen, Integrating New Values With Old Uses in the Relicensing of
Kingsley Dam and Related Facilities:Making Part of the Problem a Part of the Solution, in
DAMS: WATER AND POWER IN THE NEW WEST, (1 8th Annual Summer Conference Nat.
Resources L. Ctr., University of Colorado School of Law, 1997).
55. Nebraska water law and the federal Endangered Species Act both recognize instream
flow rights. See J. David Aiken, hIstreai Appropriations in Nebraska, in INSTREAM FLOW
PROTECTION INTHE WEST

313, 314 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell et al. eds., 1993).

56. Commentators have advocated an expanded sharing principle, a "community of
property" model which is premised on co-riparian cooperation. Under this model, rivers
and associated resources are jointly managed without regard to international borders, on the
principle that all riparian states are entitled to equitable participation in the development of
the resource. Unfortunately, this theory does not yet reflect state practice.
57. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 149 (Sept. 25).
See Sharon A. Williams, Public InternationalLaw and Water Quantity Management in a
Common DrainageBasin: The Great Lakes, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 155, 165 (1986).
58. Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416
[hereinafter Stockholm Conference Report].
59. World Water Conference, Mar. 7-18, 1977, 15 I.L.M. 734.
60. Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and
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Modern international water law rejects the idea that

upper riparian states have an absolute right, by virtue of their territorial
sovereignty, to water that originates in their boundaries.
Modern
international water law equally rejects the idea that lower states have an

absolute servitude that entitles them to the natural flow of all rivers.62 The
United States asserted the former in the notorious Harmon Doctrine,6 3 but

the subsequent state practice of recognizing the claims of Mexico to a share
of the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers,' and the long history of the
shared use of international waters between Canada and the United States,
have led to the conclusion that exclusive sovereignty was never a widely
accepted state practice.'
International water law promotes development although it must
accommodate two conflicting legal principles: equitable sharing and the
exclusive right of each state to develop its resources to a greater degree

than must occur in a federal system.'

Both principles ultimately lead to

the protection of prior uses and the idea that the entire dependable flow of
the river should be dedicated to consumptive uses. The tests to determine
reasonable and equitable use change with different formulations, but all
derive from the 1967 Helsinki Rules. 67 The relevant factors to consider in
determining what constitutes reasonable and equitable uses of the water
include: geography; hydrology; climate; past utilization; population; the
economic and social needs of the basin; and the availability of alternative
sources of supply. 6 In theory, the international standard gives somewhat
less weight to pre-existing uses and more protection to environmental
values and social equity compared to the United States doctrine. However,

Development, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
61. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, 36 I.L.M. at 700.
62. See 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 3 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991) (discussing the
development of international water law).
63. The Harmon Doctrine refers to an 1895 opinion by United States Attorney General
of Ohio, Judson Harmon, advising the Secretary of State that the United States had absolute
sovereignty over the waters of the Rio Grande River in Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas
before it reached the Mexican border. 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 281 (1895). See generally

Jacob Austin, Canadian-U.S. Practice and Theory Respecting the International Law of

International Rivers: Study and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine, 37 CAN. BAR REV. 393
(1959).
64. See Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1966);
Charles J. Meyers & Richard L. Noble, The Colorado River: The Treaty with Mexico, 19
STAN. L. REV. 367, 367-69 (1967).
65. See Austin, supra note 62; see also Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Harmon Doctrine
One Hundred Years Later: Buried, Not Praised, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 549 (1996).
66. Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Conference illustrates the tension between these
two concepts:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Stockholm Conference Report, supra note 57, 11 I.L.M. at 1420.
67. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, 52 INT'L L. ASS'N
484 (1966) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules].
68. Id., art. V.
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flexibility is achieved at the cost of indeterminacy and the net result is that
rapid, uncoordinated, multiple-use development is rewarded over
environmental protection.6 9
C. THE GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS DAM DECISION

The role of international environmental and water law in protecting
riverine ecosystems is underdeveloped but emerging. Little hard law exists
despite the many declarations, sets of rules, principles, and the
Convention.7" The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") illustrates in the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam decision, both the underdevelopment and
emergence of hard law. 71 In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros decision, the ICJ
affirmed the primacy of equitable apportionment and suggested that the
doctrine can include an aquatic ecosystem conservation component, but
rejected an ecosystem protection claim by a downstream riparian state.7 2
The opinion offers some hope that international environmental and water
law will recognize that riparian states have a right to the protection of their
riverine ecosystems from the actions of other states and that cooperation
and shared management may be required to enjoy this right. The facts of
the case were not ideal for the establishment of such a claim, but the
foundation for future protection through adaptive aquatic ecosystem
management can be found in both the majority opinion and especially in the
Separate Opinion of Vice President Weeramantry.73
In 1997, the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros decision was ICJ's first major case
that related to the allocation and environmental protection of an
international river, the Danube. The case grew out of a joint river basin
investment treaty entitled the Treaty on the Construction and Operation of
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Barrage System ("1977 Treaty"), signed on
September 16, 1977. The 1977 Treaty was signed at the height of the Cold
War between then Czechoslovakia and Hungary for the construction of the
multiple purpose Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
hydroelectric,
navigation
improvement, and flood control lock and dam project on the Danube
between Bratislava and Budapest. 74 The project consisted of two series of
interconnected locks, each in the territory of one state, a dam in the joint
territory (the Gabcikovo dam), and another dam downstream solely in

69. The difficulty of applying the rules to the Jordan River in the Middle East is a prime
example of the indeterminacy of apportionment standards. See Sharif S. Elmusa, Dividing
Common Water Resources According to International Water Law: The Case of PalestinianIsraeli Waters, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 223 (1995).
70. See Patricia K. Wouters, An Assessment of Recent Developments in International
Watercourse Law through the Prism of Substantive Rules Governing Use Allocation, 36
NAT. RESOURCES J. 417, 419-21 (1996); Forward to, INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW:
SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE Xiii-XXVi (1997).
71. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 16-17. See generally Paul R. Williams, International Environmental Dispute
Resolution: The Dispute Between Slovakia and Hungary Concerning Construction of the
Gabcikovo and Nagymnaros Damns, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1994).

Issue 2

SAFEGUARDING INT'L RIVER ECOSYSTEMS

Hungary (the Nagymaros dam).7" Article 14 of the 1977 Treaty provided
that the two countries would agree to the establishment of a Danube water
balance between the two dams "unless natural conditions or other
circumstances temporarily require a greater or smaller discharge" to insure
that the contemplated Gabcikovo bypass canal and hydroelectric plant to be
built in Czechoslovakian territory did not impair the flow of the Danube
for navigation.76
During the 1980s, the project became controversial in Hungary for
economic and environmental reasons.77 By the spring of 1989, the
Gabcikovo dam was eighty-five percent complete and the bypass canal was
between sixty and ninety-five percent complete; Hungary, however, had
only constructed the coffer dam for its promised downstream Nagymaros
dam in the Danube bend. 78 After growing concerns about the economic
feasibility of the project and unresolved environmental risks, Hungary
unilaterally suspended work on the project in 1989 and suspended the 1977
Treaty as a "mistake" after breaking away from the then-Soviet Union in
1990. 79
Hungary justified the suspension of the 1977 Treaty as an
"ecological state of necessity." 8 The possible ecological risks raised by
Hungary included the replacement of Danube groundwater flow with
stagnant upstream reservoir water, the silting of the Danube,
eutrophication, and the threat to aquatic habitats from peaking power
releases. 8
The newly-established Slovakia continued to implement an
alternative solution, formulated by Czechoslovakia prior to the 1993
division of the two countries, which involved a dam and diversion solely
on her territory. 82 Hungary unilaterally terminated the 1977 Treaty in
1992.83
The ICJ decided the respective states' rights under the 1977 Treaty and
did not directly apportion the flow of the Danube. 84 To justify termination,
Hungary invoked a number of familiar contract defenses, including
impossibility and changed circumstances, and asserted that the emerging
precautionary principle imposed "an erga omnes obligation of prevention
of damage. . . ." and thus precluded her continued performance of the
treaty.85 To defend suspension of the 1977 Treaty, Hungary invoked
Article 33 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on the
International Responsibility of States, which allows a state to avoid an
international obligation when so doing is the only means to "safeguard..
an essential interest of the State against a grave and imminent peril. 86 In a
75.

See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 20.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 22.
See id.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 37, 222.
Id. at 36-37.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 35 (Sept. 25).
Id. at 25.
See id.
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id. at 39.
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significant expansion of the concept of state necessity, the ICJ agreed that
the environmental risks related to an essential state interest.87 However,
the ICJ rejected some of the broader proposed readings of the
precautionary principle and interpreted Article 33 to require "that a real
'grave' and 'imminent peril' existed in 1989 and that the measures" of the
state were "the only possible response."88 Article 33 embodies a limited
precautionary principle, but to invoke it a state must demonstrate by
credible scientific evidence that a real risk will materialize in the near
future and is thus more than a possibility. 9 The ICJ found that Hungary's
evidence of risk and the possible range of alternatives did not meet the
standards of Article 33. 90
Hungary also argued that the rejection of the 1977 Treaty was justified
by changed environmental and political circumstances, but neither was
found sufficient to justify non-performance of the treaty. 91 By a fourteen to
one vote, the ICJ concluded that the 1977 Treaty created a territorial
regime on the reach of the Danube that was unaffected by the break up of
the former Czechoslovakia. 92 The ICJ rejected Hungary's environmentally
changed conditions defense because the possibility that subsequent
environmental information would require a modification of the project was
not completely unforeseen in 1977 and did not preclude a mutual
adjustment by the two countries. 93 The ICJ deemed environmental risks
not to be the kind of exceptional circumstances that require a court to
disturb the principle of pacta sunt servanta.94 Thus, the 1977 Treaty
regime remained in place. However, the ICJ acknowledged that changed
environmental conditions might effect the operation of a project.95 Thus,
new knowledge of ecological risk may impose a duty on parties to a
complex river basin development treaty to consider the information in the
ongoing implementation of the treaty and management of the river.
Slovakia was unable to convince the ICJ to order Hungary to complete
the project because Slovakia had also breached the 1977 Treaty through its
unilateral diversion which violated the doctrine of equitable apportionment
and the doctrine that self-help must be proportional to a suffered injury.96
87.
88.

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 41 (Sept. 25).
Id.; see also Afshin A-Khavari & Donald R. Rothwell, The IJC and Danube Dan

Case: A Missed Opportunityfor InternationalEnvironmental Law?, 22

MELB.

U. L.

REV.

507, 515 (1998) (arguing that a required level of scientific certainty will defeat the
operation of the precautionary principle).
89. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 41.

90. See id.
91. Id.at 64.
92. Id. at 11.
93. Id. at 82.
94. Id. at 143-44, 224.
95. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 92 (Sept. 25). See
Upper Snake River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Hodel, 921 F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) did not apply to the operations
of dams constructed before NEPA's passage). But see Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v.
Green, 953 F. Supp. 1133, 1147 (D. Or. 1997) (holding NEPA requirement applied to ongoing management activities).

96. See Gabcikovo-NagynarosProject, 1997 I.C.J. at 7.

Issue 2

SAFEGUARDING INT'L RIVER ECOSYSTEMS

The ICJ first held that Slovakia's alternative, which temporarily diverted
ninety percent of the flow of the Danube, violated the 1977 Treaty regime
because it contemplated joint, not unilateral, actions.97 Thus, Slovakia
could not justify its unilateral actions as mitigating damages because "an
injured State which has failed to take the necessary measures to limit
damage sustained would not be entitled to claim compensation for that
damage which could have been avoided." 9' Under customary international
water law, Slovakia's territorial alternative was an illegal diversion because
she deprived "Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of
the natural resources of the Danube . . . 9 In the end, the ICJ voted
thirteen to two that the two states must undertake good faith negotiations
consistent with both international environmental norms such as sustainable
developmentl °° and the law of international water courses to develop a new
management scheme in the context of the already constructed projects in
Slovakia.01°
The ICJ's opinion, limited as it is, firmly establishes that international
rivers are shared resources subject to the principle of equitable
apportionment and that all riparian states have equal rights to enjoy both
the commodity and non-commodity ecological benefits of the river,
hydrologically connected groundwater, and the riparian corridors. For this
reason, the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam decision is an extremely important
international and environmental protection precedent because the opinion
integrates the merging norms of international environmental protection and
the law of international watercourses into the law of treaties and water
management, clearly establishing that the doctrine of equitable
apportionment is the grundnorm of international water law. The case: (1)
confirms that multiple purpose river basin development treaties may
establish a continuing (and environmentally sensitive) management regime
that cannot be unilaterally abrogated; (2) recognizes that sustainable
development and ecological risk assessment may be incorporated into the
customary rules of international water law; and (3) holds that these
customary rules can apply to treaties negotiated prior to the recognition of
these emerging norms.
Vice President Weeramantry of Sri Lanka, issued a separate opinion
that adopts the interrelated principles of environmentally sustainable
development and cautionary environmental assessment and management as
erga omnes customary rules. 10 2 After an extensive survey of the
97.
98.

Id. at 50.
Id. at 44.

99. Id. at 45.
100. Id. at 83 (downgrading sustainable development to a "concept" rather than a
principle).
101. In 1995, Slovakia and Hungary signed a temporary agreement to divide the water in
the Danube between the original river bed and the Moson branch. The increased water
flow was expected to repair the ecological damage at the expense of an annual decrease of
150 gigawatt hours of electric production at Gabcikovo.
Hydroelectric and Other
Renewable
Energy
(last
modified
May
24,
1996)
< http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo96/hydro.html >.
102. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 88 (Sept. 25)
(separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry).
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emergence of international environmental law and the Asian history of
balancing resource use and nature protection, he concluded that among the
principles
which may be extracted from the systems already referred to are such farreaching principles as the principle of trusteeship of earth resources, the
principle of intergenerational rights and the principle that development
and environmental conservation must go hand in hand. Land is to be
respected as having a vitality of its own and being integrally linked to the
welfare of the community. . . . Sustainable development is thus not
merely a principle of modem international law. It is one of the most
ancient ideas in the human heritage. Fortified from the insights that can
be gained from millennia of human experience,
it has an important role to
103
play in the service of international law.
IV. THE INCOMPLETE INCORPORATION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION DUTIES INTO
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW
While equitable utilization is a sound principle of international law,
considerable tension exists between the concept and sustainable aquatic
ecosystem protection and management. Equitable utilization was part of
international law before the concept of international environmental law
began to coalesce in the 1970s after the 1972 Stockholm Conference and
environmentalists viewed the doctrine with some distrust because it seems
to allow "reasonable environmental degradation."" ° This distrust reflects
the inevitable tension between protecting and using nature.
All
international efforts to promote environmental protection exist in the
context of the right to develop-vigorously championed by developing
5
countries°"-and
the background principle of water law which has never
103. Id. at 110. See. Eva M. Kornicker Uhlmann, State Community Interests, Jus Cogens
and Protection of the Global Environment: Developing Criteriafor Peremptory Norms, 11

ENVTL. L. REV. 101, 125-28 (1998) (discussing the jurisprudential basis for
Vice-President Weeramantry's suggestion that international environmental law norms may
evolve into erga ones obligations).
104. See generally LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
FROM THE TWENTIETH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (3d ed. 1996).
105. See Bengt Broms, Natural Resources: Sovereignty Over, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 306 (1987) (discussing the history of the relationship between
the right to develop and state sovereignty). Modern environmental law, of course,
challenges unlimited sovereignty. See, e.g., Kerstin Odendhal, DIE UMWELTPFLICHTIGKEIT
DER SOUVERANITAT [THE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SOVEREIGNTY] (1998) (stating
the sovereign right to develop continues to be the "real" practice of the international
community).
The principle of the right to develop is beginning to play a role in water use controversies.
The Canadian Provinces and the U.S. states which border the Great Lakes are concurrently
concerned about the environmental and other risks posed by possible water withdrawals for
bulk tanker shipments, and the right to develop is the conceptual basis for an anti-export
strategy. Some international trade experts, especially in Canada, have opined that Article
XI of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") invalidate all flat export bans. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT];
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 289 & 605
GEO. INT'L
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been preservation of the natural hydrologic regime. Perhaps for these
reasons, the Rio Declaration does not directly mention equitable utilization;
however, the Rio Declaration and preparatory conference documents

[hereinafter NAFTA]. Article XI bans "prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes
or other charges. . . "on exports and imports, but Article XX(g) allows a state to defend an
export ban that is necessary to conserve "exhaustible natural resources." GATT, arts. XI &
XX(g). The three NAFTA countries have agreed to exclude non-bottled water from the
agreement. The text provides in part:
The NAFTA creates no rights to natural water resources of any party to the
Agreement unless water, in any form, has entered into commerce and become a
good or product, it is not covered by the provisions of any trade agreement
including the NAFTA. And nothing in the NAFTA would oblige any NAFTA
Party to either exploit its water for commercial use, or to begin exporting water in
any form. Water in its natural state in lakes, rivers, reservoirs, aquifers, water
basins and the like is not a good or product, is not traded, and therefore is not and
never has been subject to the terms of any trade agreement.
Accord for the Prohibition of Bulk Water Removal From Drainage Basins (last modified
Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.ccme.ca/le_about/legcommuniques/leg7_water.html>
[hereinafter Accord]. Canada's North American Free Trade Implementation Act similarly
provides that water in packages, products, or tanks is a good, but that natural surface or
groundwater, is not. R.S.C., ch. 44, § 7(2) (1993) (Can.). This "soft" declaration does
not, of course, settle the issue.
All Canadian provinces, with the exception of Quebec, have agreed to a ban on bulk water
removal from the Canadian portion of the country's major drainage basins. See Accord.
The policy will be implemented by each province and contains several exemptions and
exclusions such as bottled water, water packaged in small portable containers, water used in
food production, water to meet short term safety, security or humanitarian needs "and other
purposes as determined by individual jurisdictions to meet environmental and other
management needs consistent with the objective of the Accord." Id. The Water Resources
Act of 1986 allows any Great Lakes state to veto any withdrawal outside of the basin. 42
U.S.C. § 1962d-20(d) (1994).
The opposite argument is that neither GATT nor NAFTA change the basic principle that
state sovereignty allows a state to decide whether to allow trade in raw natural resources.
Several World Trade Organization ("WTO") decisions reject the conservation defense when
a nation has attempted to conserve marine resources outside of its territory. However, the
WTO decisions do not preclude the application of environmental and other conservation
measures to a nation's internal waters because they are premised on the protection of state
sovereignty over internal resources. Recent WTO Appellate decisions have qualified
Article XX by holding that export restrictions must not only fall within the enumerated list
in Article XX but they must also be consistent with the "chapeau" which provides that
"such measures are not [to be] applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade." WTO Appellate Body, Report of
the Appellate Body in U.S.-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35
I.L.M. 603, 617 (1996); see also WTO Appellate Body, Report of the Appellate Body of
U.S.-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 36 I.L.M. 832,
WT/DS58/AB R (Oct. 1998) (complaint by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand holding
the U.S.'s failure to justify the application of different standards to different exporting
countries and recognized the right of WTO members to preserve their environmental
resources); Bret Puls, The Murky Waters of International Environmental Jurisprudence:A
Critique of Recent WTO Holdings in the Shrimp/Turtle Controversy, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 343 (1999); GATT Dispute Panel Report on Mex. Complaint Concerning U.S.
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 1991 WL 771248 (Sept. 3, 1991); GATT Dispute Panel
Report on EEC & Neth. Complaint Concerning U.S. Restriction on Imports of Tuna, 1994
WL 907620 (June 16, 1994). Traditional water conservation management does not violate
the fundamental premise of trade law that all trade partners be treated in a nondiscriminatory manner. See generally INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMM'N, PROTECTION OF THE
WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES: FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES

(2000).
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incorporate the basic ideas of equitable apportionment.' " Principle 2
reaffirms both the right to exploit sovereign resources and the duty to avoid
damage to the environment of other states."°7 This is reinforced in
Principles 17 and 19 which mandate international environmental

assessments and require that a state undertaking an activity "that may have
a significant adverse transboundary environmental effect" notify potentially
affected states and consult with them "at an early stage and in good
faith." 0 8 Preparatory documents reaffirm the importance of shared use of
transboundary resources."
This section of the article examines three
examples of the tension between equitable utilization and sustainable
aquatic ecosystem protection and management.
A. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: LIMITED BARRIERS TO ADAPTATION

Projected changes in the global climate from carbon dioxide ("C0 2")

emissions create additional stresses for international water allocation
regimes and dependent ecosystems.

After a period of retreat from the

extreme predictions of the 1980s, the scientific community seems to be
coalescing around the view that the problem is a serious one," 0 although
this view is much contested. If changes occur, existing allocation regimes
will face challenges because they are premised on the availability of a
guaranteed supply of water or the average annual flow augmented by carryover storage."' If droughts and increased evaporation occur, the available
water from international rivers will be consistently less than the parties to
the allocation regimes originally expected and existing allocation regimes
have no mechanisms to adjust to these changed conditions."12 Many

"experts" have suggested that increased reliance on markets or existing
allocation regimes can mitigate the projected effects of global climate

change." 3 However, international water allocation is a prime example of
Declaration, supra note 59.
princ. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 876.
princs. 17 & 19, 31 I.L.M. at 879.
generally Protection of the Quality and Supply of Freshwater Resources:
of Integrated Approaches to the Development, Management and Use of Water
Report
of
the
Secretary
General
of
the
Conference,
A/CONF.151/PC/100/ADD.22, reprinted in 1 AGENDA 21 & THE UNCED PROCEEDINGS
513-57 (1992).
110. See Gretta Goldenman, Adapting to Climate Change: A Study of International Rivers
and Their Legal Arrangements, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 741, 762-66 (1990).
111. The latest United States assessment warns of increased droughts, earlier spring
runoffs, lower summer flows, and higher evapotranspiration rates.
U.S. National
Assessment of the Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change.
<http://www.nacc.usgcrp.gov/sectors/water/draft-report/fullreport.html>
(last visited
6/12/00).
112. See Lazerwitz, supra note 6, at 269-70.
113. I have addressed these issues at greater length in A. Dan Tarlock, Now, Think Again
About Adaptation, 9 ARIZ. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 169 (1992). Water marketing has been
proposed as an adaptation strategy. Economists and many western water critics have long
criticized western water law because it ignores higher, alternative values of water. Critics
assert that too much water is used to grow surplus or low-valued crops, too much water is
used in a wasteful manner, and that increased transfers are desirable. Prior appropriation
allocates the risks of shortages by a simple principle-priority of use. The question is how
106. Rio
107. Id.,
108. Id.,
109. See
Application
Resources:
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the lack of adaptation mechanisms in existing allocation institutions and the
fact that adaptation solutions remain untested and problematic.
International river agreements are often negotiated so that a dam can be
built accompanied by the expectation that any shortages will be short-term
and mitigated by the carry-over storage of the reservoir. The resulting
treaties often provide only for temporary reallocations and contain no
mechanism to address long term declines in expected available supply. For
example, the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement allocates a fixed amount of
water to Egypt and the Sudan, but does not bind the other basin states and
provides only a weak mechanism for short-term drought relief.1 14 The
Mexican-United States Treaty ("1944 Water Treaty"), which allocates the
Colorado River between the two countries, provides that the United States
need not fulfill its delivery duty in extraordinary drought.11 Because it is
not clear that this would apply to global warming, Mexico is not
guaranteed a clear entitlement if long term supplies decline. If the normal
drought mechanisms are used, the resulting allocations may be widely
perceived as inefficient and unfair and will not be followed. Water
marketing may be possible but will be difficult between sovereign
nations." 6 In short, adaptation is not a realistic option when an allocation
regime lacks mechanisms to deal with changed conditions." 7
B. THE PRIORITY OF DEVELOPMENT OVER ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
The core idea of equal development opportunity is at the heart of the
Convention. Thus, equal development will be the basis for the argument
that development has priority over aquatic ecosystem protection. The
innovations of the Convention are commendable, but the fact remains that
the protection of a river system's ecological integrity remains secondary to
the promotion of development. Specifically, the Convention makes it
difficult to promote the protection of the ecological integrity of river
systems for two principal reasons. First, the new rules largely exclude
floodplain and wetland protection and focus almost exclusively on pollution
prevention. Second, rivers are still not viewed as ecosystems.
Article 5 of the Convention enjoins states to use watercourses in an
"equitable and reasonable manner."" 8 The next sentence reinforces the

flexible the water transfer system will be in the future. Two sets of problems, one
institutional, the other distributional must be addressed. The first question is whether water
users will respond sufficiently to market incentives. The second and more difficult question
is whether the redistributions commanded by the market are fair and consistent with
ecosystem sustainability in both the short and long run. See COMMITTEE ON WESTERN
WATER MGMT., NATIONAL RES. COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY,

EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992).

114. See Goldenmann, supra note 109, at 749-56.
115. Treaty Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of
the Rio Grande, Feb. 3 & Nov. 14, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter the 1944
Water Treaty].
116. See supra note 111.
117. See Meyers & Noble, supra note 63.
118. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 5, 36 I.L.M. at 711.
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idea that development is primary and environmental protection is secondary
stating that, "[i]n particular, an international watercourse shall be used and
developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and
sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account
the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with adequate
protection of the watercourse.""' 9 Article 6 follows Article 5 and lists
seven non-weighted factors relevant to the determination of what is
equitable and reasonable. 12 ° While the factors are the subject of extensive
debate, the important point is that they promote development by either
protecting existing development or facilitating new development. For
example, Article 6(e) rewards states that develop first because existing uses
are a relevant factor. 2 ' Slower developing states are equally encouraged to
develop by the ability to show a "social and economic need" for the water,
recognition of the value of "potential" as well as existing uses, and the
ability to argue the comparative efficiency of different water uses, although
this is a high burden to sustain. 122
1. Pollution: A Use to be Tolerated or Mitigated
The reporters of the Convention were sensitive to the tension between
development and environmental protection. The reporters tried to mitigate
this tension, one of the most difficult problems the drafters of the
Convention faced. 123 The final version of the Convention incorporates
some elements of the idea of ecosystem protection into multiple-use
development, but the integration is incomplete and the Convention still
promotes the continuation of this problem' because pollution prevention
and ecosystem degradation remain subordinate to use. Pollution reduction
and prevention is an important component of ecosystem protection, as
illustrated by the joint Canada-United States Great Lakes pollution control
strategy.' l 5 However, the focus on pollution can be too narrow because it
ignores more subtle threats to ecosystems from diversions, barriers, and
land use practices. Modern environmentally sensitive legal regimes try to
correct this problem by mandating or encouraging long-term, monitored,
adaptive ecosystem management, but the concept remains vague,
controversial, 126 and very difficult and costly to integrate into existing river
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id., art. 6, 36 I.L.M. at 719.
Id.
Id.
See Albert Utton, Which Rule Should Prevail in International Water Disputes: That
of Reasonableness or That of No Hann?, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 635 (1996).
124. See Robert Rosenstock, The Forty-Fifth Session of the International Law
Commission, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 139 (1994).

125. See

NATIONAL RES. COUNCIL, THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT: AN

EVOLVING INSTRUMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT (1985); Symposium, Prevention of
Groundwater Contamination in the Great Lakes Region, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345 (1989).

126.

Many ecologists criticize the concept of adaptive ecosystem management as simply a

restatement of multiple-use development. See Noss & COOPERIDER, supra note 27, at 21013. Proponents of multiple-use development often see the concept as a new antidevelopment regime. See e.g., Rebecca Thomson, Ecosystem Management: Great Idea,
But What Is It, Will It Work, and Who Will Pay?, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 42 (1995).
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management regimes. International rules adopt the view that adverse
environmental impacts are an inevitable consequence of development that
can often be mitigated rather than prevented.
Article 7 initially enjoined states to use water "in such a way as not to
cause appreciable harm to other watercourse states," but two objections
surfaced that led to a major revision.' 27 Proponents of multiple-use
development criticized the Article 7 standard as a departure form the
common understanding of equitable apportionment because it subordinates
development to environmental quality.'
Environmentalists made the
opposite criticism that the section does add a new environmental protection
dimension, but does not prohibit all harm, rather only harm "capable of
being established by objective evidence;" thus, it does not include the
crucial concept of risk prevention.' 29 The basic solution, proposed by the
last reporter, was to subordinate the duty to prevent pollution to the right
of equitable utilization, but to create a flexible process to resolve disputes.
Article 7 was redrafted to impose a duty on states and create a process not
to cause significant pollution, subject to an extraordinary circumstances
exception.
Watercourse States shall exercise due diligence to utilize an international
watercourse in such a way as not to cause significant harm to other water
course states, absent their agreement, except as may be allowable under
an equitable and reasonable use of the watercourse. A use which causes
significant harm in the form of pollution shall be presumed to be an
inequitable and unreasonable use unless there is: (a) a clear showing of
special circumstances indicating a compelling need for ad hoc adjustment;
30
and (b) the absence of any imminent threat to human health and safety.'
The final version of Section 7 was changed in the United Nations prior
to adoption and accords equitable utilization a strong preference over the
no-harm doctrine.13 ' Section 7 is a victory for slower developing upstream
states132 and provides:
1. Watercourse states shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in
their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of
significant harm to other watercourse states.
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse
state, the State whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of an
agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard
127. See Edith Brown Weiss et al., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
875-80 (1998) (providing a history of the drafting of Article 7).
128.

See International Law Comm'n, supra note 33, at 4-8.

129. See Paisley & McDaniels, supra note 11, at 124-25.
130. First Report of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 4 5th Sess.,
Report ,1 at 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/451 (1993).
131. See Charles B. Bourne, The Primacy of the Principle of Equitable Utilization in the
1997 Watercourses Convention, 1997 CAN. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 215, 221-24 (1997).
132.

See McCaffrey, supra note 26, at 12; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting the Law of

Water Management: To Global Climate and Other Hydrological Stresses, 35 J. AMER.
WATER RES. Ass'N 1301, 1319 (1999).

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 3

for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected
State, to eliminate or mitigate such133harm and, where appropriate, to
discuss the question of compensation.
Compared to prior formulations of equitable apportionment, the
Convention is a step forward because it places more emphasis on
conservation and alternatives. 34 Article 6(a) requires the consideration of
"geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other
factors of a natural character," and (g) makes available alternatives of
"comparable" value to a planned use relevant in deciding whether a use is
equitable and reasonable."I' Unlike United States law, 136 Article 6(f) makes
"[c]onservation, protection, development and the economy of use of the
water resources" a relevant factor to take
into account in determining
137
whether a use is reasonable and equitable.
2. The Isolation of River Corridors from the Water: Rivers Are Canals
Not Ecosystems
International water law remains a channel-not watershed or
ecosystem-based-legal regime. This focus is inherently biased toward
development and against ecosystem protection. The Convention applies to
international watercourses not river systems. The Convention defines the
term "watercourse" as "a system of surface waters and groundwaters
constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and
naturally flowing into a common terminus. 13 8 The definition is
progressive because it includes connected groundwater and recognizes that
groundwater depletion is a major cause of stream and riverine ecosystem
degradation but land in watersheds and confined aquifers probably remain
separate from the rules. Thus, management initiatives can exclude
necessary land management
options so the definition can be fairly
39
characterized as narrow. 1
Ultimately, the definition is a step-backward from previous definitions
of international river systems. More generally, domestic and international
legal regimes maintain a persistent but artificial separation of rivers from
the floodplains 4 ° and wetlands. Thus, this separation influences domestic

133. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 7, 36 I.L.M. at 706.
134. Note, Come Hell or High Water: A Water Regime for the Jordan River Basin, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 919 (1997).
135. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 6, 36 I.L.M. at 706
(emphasis added).
136. See supra Part III.A.
137. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 6, 36 I.L.M. at 706.
138. Id., art. 2, 36 I.L.M. at 704.
139. The San Pedro River depletions must be addressed by the creation of a long binational conservation area. See infra note 141.
140.
Human actions that dampen or eliminate natural disturbances are likely to be a
threat to biodiversity in many kinds of environments. For example, many riparian
plant species such as cottonwoods become established after floods, which create
new deposits of bare silt and gravel where seedlings can establish. Eliminating
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and international legal regimes (and which they influence) to prevent water
use rules-premised on the need to share a common resource-from
Further, under some
becoming a basis for land use regulation.
interpretations of equitable apportionment, traditional practices such as the
use of flood waters for irrigation may be inefficient and impose a duty on a
riparian state to conserve water for the benefit of downstream states.
Waste counts against a state in the balancing test, and conservation has
traditionally meant that water should be efficiently consumed.
The Convention, however, does contain several innovative new
environmental protection rules. For example, Article 20 requires that
states protect the ecosystems of international watercourses, and Article 22
requires a state to "take all measures necessary to prevent the introduction
of species, alien or new" into a river system if the species "may have
effects detrimental to the ecosystem of the watercourse.'141 This standard
originates from the objections that Canada142lodged against the United States
Garrison Diversion Unit in North Dakota.
The current risks faced by the Upper San Pedro River illustrate the
need to view international rivers as integrated ground and surface water
systems with broad corridor ecosystems. On the Upper San Pedro, a small
river that flows north from the state of Sonora, Mexico into Arizona where
it joins the Gila River, downstream groundwater depletion may destroy the
143
largest surviving expanse of broadleaf riparian forest in the region.
"[P]umping reduces the flow of the river and consequently adversely
affects riparian vegetation" 144 unless the perennial flows in the Upper San
Pedro Basin can be sustained. In 1998, Congress created the San Pedro
National Conservation Area made up, in part, of retired farmland and
water rights on the upper reaches of the United States portion of the river.
However, this effort will not preserve the corridor. The only viable
solution recommended by an expert study commissioned by the Council on
Environmental Cooperation was to extend the protected area to straddle the
Mexican-United States border.1 45 It is possible to re-establish high quality
riparian habitat in Mexico by redistributing United States pumping and
retiring irrigated agriculture and grazing. The solution will not be easy.
The solution options include actually reversing the urban and agricultural
periodic flooding by building dams may prevent regeneration of many species and
drastically alter riparian plant communities.
Noss & COOPERIDER, supra note 27, at 45. See generally Thayer Scudder, The Need and
Justification for Maintaining Transboundary Flood Regimes: The Africa Case, 31 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 75 (1991).
141. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, arts. 20 & 22, 36 I.L.M. at
710.
142. See Charles M. Carvell, The North Dakota Garrison Diversion Project and
InternationalEnvironmental Law, 60 N.D. L. REV. 603 (1984).
143. See SAN PEDRO EXPERT STUDY TEAM, SUSTAINING AND ENHANCING RIPARIAN
MIGRATORY BIRD HABITATION ON THE UPPER SAN PEDRO RIVER (Commission on Envtl.
1999)
Cooperation
< http://www.cec.org/pubs-info resources/publications/mandate-pubs/sanped.cfm?varlan
=english>.
144. Id. at 16.
145. Id. at 18.
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growth in the region146 through land retirement and the acquisition of
conservation easements to prevent the potential expansion of irrigated
agriculture.
3. Preservation of the Flow of Rivers for Ecosystem Maintenance is
Problematic
General duties to protect ecosystems will not be effective because
downstream states lack effective control of both the rate and quality of the
flow of international rivers under international water law. Upstream states
do not need to seek the consent of downstream states to make a diversion
because they have a right to a fair share of the river. In short, international
law does not provide a natural flow rule.1 47 The material injury rule,
which is at the heart of equitable apportionment, allows upstream states to
progressively use water, which creates the risk of environmental damage,
but not legally cognizable damage. For example, upstream diversions may
generally increase the salinity of rivers by allowing salt water to migrate
upstream. In addition, pollution is often limited to serious and identifiable
pollution rather than less visible, cumulative impacts from environmentally
destructive watershed land use practices. The presumed remedy is post
hoc mitigation rather than prevention. 4'
Flow control is limited because the rules appear to adopt the
conventional, narrow definition of harm as a demonstrated injury. The
rules do not include any concept of future environmental risk, making it
difficult to prevent harm. The controversy over the proposed Windy
Craggy mine on the Tatshenshini River in British Columbia, Canada,
which is upstream from two national parks in Alaska and one in Canada,
illustrates the limits of a simple harm prevention standard and the need for
the inclusion of risk analysis and prevention in international water law. In
1988, the Geddes Resources, a mining company, applied to the government
of British Columbia to open a copper mine on the river.1 49 Intense
environmental opposition to the mine arose from the risk of long term acid
drainage and consequent damage to salmon fisheries, which led British
Columbia to scrub the mining plan and to preserve the Tatshenshini as a
UNESCO World Heritage Site. 5 °
Windy Craggy illustrates the potential value of applying the principles of
international water law to resolving international water controversies.
The Windy Craggy controversy also suggests that there are ways in which
146. Id. at 17-18.
147. See Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101 (Arb. Trib. 1957)

(widely read to reject any right to the undiminished flow of an international stream);
Charles B. Bourne, The Right to Utilize Waters of International Rivers, 1965 CAN. Y.B.

L. 187, 190- 203 (1965) (providing a full exposition of the rise and fall of the theory
of natural flow).
INT'L

148. See Toru Iwama, Emerging Principles and Rules for the Prevention and Mitigation
of EnvironmentalHarm, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL

107 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1992).
149. Paisley & McDaniels, supra note 11, at 114.
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150. Id. at 117.
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international water law could be made more useful to decision-makers.
Among the limitations to existing international water law is its inability to
deal with situations where risk of international water pollution is the
issue. A partial solution might be to extend international water law to
include a principle of informed negotiated consent that would build on the
foundation set by the principle of equitable utilization and reasonable use
in the Helsinki Rules and help to meld the Helsinki Rules to the ILC Draft
Rules. 151

Finally, flow protection requires continuous management. However,
the rules do not promote management because they assume that mitigation
is a single, final solution. Article 17 requires that a notifying state
negotiate with a potential victim state if the proposed use will be
inequitable."5 2 The purpose of the negotiation is to arrive at "an equitable
resolution of the situation."' 5 3 An adaptive management regime could be
an equitable resolution of many conflicts, but the resolution connotes a
final mitigation solution. As discussed in the next section, environmentally
sustainable use requires the development of continuous management
regimes rather than on time, often poorly implemented and assessed
mitigation solutions.
V. THE ELEMENTS OF A MANAGEMENT REGIME
A. THE LEGAL BASIS OF SHARED MANAGEMENT

The future of international river basin use will be increasingly based on
the environmentally sustainable management of the total system. Existing
facilities may have to be re-engineered and re-operated to simulate pre-dam
flows to promote sustainable river and river corridor uses. New facilities
will be subject to more stringent flow maintenance and monitoring
conditions and will incorporate the ability to respond more flexibly to
environmental problems. Environmental sustainable use and management
recognizes that most artificial systems are permanent landscape features,
but seeks to use adaptive management to achieve use patterns that start
from the assumption that the historic hydrographic of the river becomes the
norm, and inconsistent uses the exception.
The shared use principle of international water law can incorporate the
idea of ecosystem protection and management because both international
water and environmental law rest on the law of state responsibility for
transboundary harm.' 54 The law is evolving toward the recognition of more
permanent ecological risk protection duties beyond the foundation principle
that states have a duty not to allow state agencies and private parties,

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 131.
International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 7, 36 I.L.M. at 709.
Id.
Dante A. Caponera, The Role of Customary International Water Law, in WATER

RESOURCES POLICY FOR ASIA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE REGIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON WATER
RESOURCES POLICY IN AGRO-SOCIo ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 365 (Mohammed Ali et al.

eds., 1987).
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subject to the state's regulatory jurisdiction,"' to use their territories in 156
a
manner that causes substantial harm to other states and their nationals.15 7
The basic duty seems firmly grounded in modern international practice,

but the actual deterrence effect of the rule is minimal. To complicate
matters, no consensus exists as to the scope of the duty and the standard of
liability. 58 For example, liability rules exist for environmental damage
resulting from inequitable uses of water,"5 9 but no broad recognized right of
compensation for general environmental degradation exists in the absence
of demonstrable injury to specific consumptive and non-consumptive
uses. 16° Moreover, a post hoc duty to compensate is, in and of itself, an

inadequate incentive for states to engage
in meaningful cooperation,
161
sharing, and environmental management.
155. State responsibility for the conduct of private parties who cause injury to the
territory of another state is widely asserted in international law, although the basis for the
duty and its scope are disputed. The basic principle is that a state must exercise due
diligence to prevent conduct, if performed by the state, which would breach its primary
international duties. This is thought to include the duty to regulate and to enforce
regulations. Developments in the Law: International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1494-96 (1991).
Section 601 of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations of the
United States endorses this duty to regulate and enforce regulations and limits the state duty
to take necessary environmental protection measures to "the extent practicable under the
circumstances." David D. Caron describes this standard as conservative compared to the
fault-based, due diligence standard of international law. David J. Caron, The Law of the
Environment:A Symbolic Step of Modest Value, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 528, 535 (1989)
156. The Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. (1938), is the basis for the two
most authoritative statements of state liability which extends to the failure to police and
regulate those acting within a state's territory. State liability for acts which injure the other
is re-enforced by the Corfu Channel decision. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949
I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). Given the paucity of precedents and the great diversity in state practice
in response to environmental insults, the international community continues to debate the
issue of whether substantive duties on states, which make trans-frontier pollution a wrongful
act, exist. See e.g., Karl Zemanek, State Responsibility and Liability, in ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

157.

187-88 (Winfried Lang et al. eds., 1991).

Johan G. Lammers, International and European Community Law Aspects of

Pollution of International Watercourses, in ENVIRONMENTAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW 115 (Winfried Lang et al. eds., 1991).

PROTECTION

AND

158. The issue is whether states are absolutely (strictly) liable or whether they are only
liable for intentional environmental insults and the failure to use due care. The argument
for a fault-based regime is that this is most consistent with the principle of sovereignty and
past practice. The International Law Commission has divided international law into the old
state responsibility and the new international liability to broaden the debate to include
"absolute" or strict liability, but the consensus is that this is a distinction without a
difference.
Francisco Orrego Vicufla, State Responsibility, Liability, and Remedial
Measures Under International Law: New Criteria for Environmental Protection, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS,

supra note 146, at 139. The strict liability rule is criticized, in part, because it discourages
serious negotiations. Merrill, supra note 12.
159. Paul R. Williams, Can International Legal Principles Play a Positive Role in
Resolving Central and East European Transboundary Environmental Disputes?, 7 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 438 (1994).
160. See William Bush, Compensation and the Utilization of International Rivers and
Lakes.: The Role of Compensation in the Event of Permanent Injury to Existing Uses of
Water, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS AND LAKES 309, 315 (Ralph
Zacklin et al. eds., 1981). In contrast to the prior Helsinki Rules, the Convention does not
provide for compensation. Helsinki Rules, supra note 66, art. V, sec. 20).
161. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, Water, Politics and International Law, in WATER IN
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The idea of shared resource management, as opposed to use, is a less
developed international law principle. Yet, shared resource management is
a logical extension of the duties to inform and consult as well as a liberal
reading of the law of state responsibility for transboundary damage. These
duties are intended to facilitate mitigation of adverse environmental
impacts. Mitigation is expanding from a single and final action to on-going
management. International environmental law principles developed since
the 1972 Stockholm Conference have influenced the progressive expansion
of international water law to include cooperation and prevention duties.
The Convention incorporates four primary harm prevention duties when
states exercise their sovereign right to develop their water resources.
States have a corollary duty to inform, consult, engage in good faith
negotiations, and to repair or compensate for any damages caused by the
inequitable use of water. 162 However, only a breach of the duty to
compensate is universally considered wrongful and the remaining duties are
relatively weak. For example, the duty to inform was dropped from the
1972 Stockholm Conference resolution at the insistence of Brazil, although
this defect was cured by Principle 19 of the Rio Declaration which includes
a good faith duty to consult at the early stages of a project. 163
A widely recognized duty of consultation on international rivers
exists, 164 although many nations continue to object to the principle and
refuse to consult. 65 The duty to inform does not include the duty to
forego. The Convention includes a duty to notify,' 66 exchange information,
and consult with other riparian states about the possible effects of planned
activities.167 A potential victim state has "six months within which to study
and evaluate the possible effects" 68 and the notifying state must supply
"any additional data and information that is available and necessary for an
accurate evaluation" of the activity. 169
Management duties can also be derived from the emerging
precautionary principle 7 ° which posits that states have the power, if not the
CRISIS: A GUIDE TO THE WORLD'S FRESH WATER RESOURCES 92 (Peter Gleick ed., 1993).
162. An exhaustive study of the influence of hard and soft international environmental
law on the right to develop water resources observes that modern sharing rules are premised
on the assumption that "the elasticity of the equitable utilization principle leads to a whole
series of procedural rules because, without such rules, States often recognize the limits of
their rights only when they unintentionally deprive another State of its equitable share."
PRECAUTIONARY LEGAL DUTIES
HAROLD HOHMANN,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 116 (1994).

163.

AND

PRINCIPLES

OF

MODERN

Rio Declaration, supra note 59, princ. 19, 31 I.L.M. at 879.

164. See Charles B. Bourne, Procedure in the Development of International Drainage
Basins, 22 U. TORONTO L.J. 172, 191 (1972).
165. For a history of Brazil's objections to the duty to consult (written by an Argentinian
scholar) see Guillermo J. Cano, Argentina, Brazil, and the de laPlata River Basin: A
Summary of Their Legal Relationship, in WATER IN A DEVELOPING WORLD 126
(Albert E. Utton & Ludwik Teclaff, eds., 1978).
166. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 12, 36 I.L.M. at 707-08.
167. Id., art. 11, 36 I.L.M. at 707.
168. Id., art. 13, 36 I.L.M. at 708.
169. Id., art. 14, 36 I.L.M. at 708.
170. See Ellen Hey, The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law:
Institutionalizing Caution, 4 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 312-18 (1991). For
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duty,"' to prevent serious risks from materializing in the absence of
provable environmental harm, if evidence of significant environmental
risks exists. While the principle is still vague,172 it probably includes a
duty to avoid foreseeable, significant risks, although issues regarding the
burden of proof remain unresolved.' 73 The precautionary principle both
reinforces and expands the duties to consult and inform. Precaution
projects the substitution of risk for provable harm that underlies United
States and European toxic pollutant regulation, as an international duty
among states and erga omnes. 74
'
Precaution is a logical response to a science-based legal regime such as
international environmental law. 175 As the international response to ozone
depletion illustrates, the precautionary principle works best when two
factors reinforce each other. First, the risks of the activity must be
sufficiently understandable and severe to pose political liabilities on
governments that ignore them. Second, as has been the case with ozone
but less so in global climate change, subsequent science must confirm the
seriousness of the identified risk. The usual remedy is to prevent or limit
the use of substances that pose environmental risks, but adaptive
management with feedback mechanisms is an equally possible application
of the precautionary principle. Precaution and the emerging duties to avoid
conflicts by advance notice could expand to include a full environmental
impact assessment. 76 A full environmental impact assessment can lead to
example, in 1983, the German government took the position that regulation of pollution in
the North Sea- was not dependent upon the proof of harm. The Second North Sea
Declaration reflects the view of Germany. In addition, other marine conventions, United
Nations sustainable development declarations, the ozone convention, and regional hazardous
waste treaties reflect this view. However, the idea of ecological risk prevention remains
underdeveloped.
171. See Gunther Handl, Environnental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to
InternationalLaw, 1 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 3 (1990).
172. See id. at 22-24 (providing a skeptical view of the precautionary principle).
173. James E. Hickey Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining The Precautionary Principle in
InternationalEnvironmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 424 (1995).
174. See HOHMANN, supra note 160 (arguing that the precautionary principle is a logical
product of the trend toward planned environmental management and that it has been so
widely adopted in binding and non-binding agreements that it has become an "instant"
customary doctrine of international law).
175. Environmentalism derives its primary force from the universal warning messages of
elite science. As James Rosenau has written:
Politicians cannot exercise control over environmental outcomes without recourse
to scientific findings. They may claim that the findings are not clear-cut or
remain subject to contradictory interpretations, but they are nonetheless dependent
on what practices of science uncover about the laws of nature ... [C]riteria of
proof are at the heart of environmental politics ... the outcomes of environmental

issues depend as much on the persuasiveness of evidence as on the various criteria
of power-superior resources, greater mass support, skill at coalition formationthat sustain or resolve other types of issues.
James N. Rosenau, Environmental Challenges in a Global Context, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA: MOVEMENTS,

PARTIES,

ORGANIZATIONS,

AND

POLICY 257, 258 (Sheldon Kamieniecki ed., 1993).
176. Gunther Handl, The Principle of "Equitable Use" as Applied to Internationally
Shared Natural Resources: its role in Resolving Potential International Disputes over
Transfrontier Pollution, 14 Revue Beige De Droit 40 (1979). Article 12 of the Convention
includes as part of the duty to notify other riparian states of possible significant adverse
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management because it identifies a range of alternatives and identifies gaps
in scientific knowledge that must be filled for effective management to
succeed. This link was made in the decision of the ICJ in the GabcikovoNagymaros dam case discussed above in Part III.C. 177 In his separate

opinion, Vice President Weeramantry

observed that the emerging

precautionary principle supports the imposition of a continuing duty of

environmental assessment and monitoring of both the construction and
operation of large water and other development projects. 178 "EIA, being a
the
specific application of the larger general principle of caution, embodies
179
larger obligation of continuing watchfulness and anticipation."
The implementation of the ecological integrity model in international
water law requires the formulation of the standards informed both by new
scientific and ethical paradigms. The new science of river management
can be informed by the ethical assumption of an obligation to future
generations, which reflects the twentieth century's humility toward
nature. 8 ° The underlying philosophical principle of much environmental
management is inter-generational equity.' l The basic idea is that "[w]e as
a species, hold the natural and cultural environment of our planet, both
with members of the present generation and with other generations, past
and future," and the principle has been rapidly adopted as an ethical norm

against which major international agreements and mandates must be

tested."8 2 The precise contours of intergenerational duties are not self-

defining, but the core idea that each generation has a duty to manage its
common patrimony for the benefit of the next generation rejects both the
prevailing ethic that resources should be' immediately consumed because
their future versus present value is likely to be low, and the more "radical"
ecological visions
of the restoration and maintenance of pre-human
83

environments. 1

Adoption of intergenerational equity fundamentally changes the nature
effects, the duty to include "the results of any environmental impact assessment" that was
done by the notifying state. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, art. 12,
36 I.L.M. at 707-08.
177. See discussion supra Part III.C.
178. See id.
179. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 113 (Sept. 25).
180. "[P]eople around the world in the 1990s are perceiving the earth as more than a
globe to be surveyed, or developed for the public good in the short term, or to be protected
from threats to its well-being both human and natural. It is all of these in some degree, but
has additional dimensions. People in many cultures accept its scientific description as a
matter of belief. They recognize a commitment to care for it in perpetuity. They accept
reluctantly an obligation to come to terms with problems posed by growth in numbers and
appetites. This is not simply anxious analysis of economic and social consequences of
political policies toward environmental matters. The roots are in a growing solemn sense of
the individual as part of one human family for whom earth is its spiritual home." Gilbert F.
White, Reflections on Changing Perceptions of the Earth, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF ENERGY
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 9 (1994).
181. Weiss, supra note 24, at 238 (arguing that present generations owe conservation
duties to future generations and that "[c]onservation of quality ... cautions against water
withdrawals that may result in pollution of water supplies . . . that will be expensive or
impossible for future generations to repair").
182. Id. at 17.
183. Id. at 22-24.
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of the water resource decision-making process and allocation norms,
regardless of the precise content of the duty. Present actions must be
evaluated in terms of the long-term consequences. All present value
economic calculations of commodity values must be weighted against
calculations that estimate the future value of the resource and incorporate
the assumption that environmental quality is the marginal value of natural
or non-degraded resources which is likely to increase over time. This is
the essence of the difference between the economics of sustainable
development and traditional cost-benefit calculations.184 One example of
the application of intergenerational equity is the incorporation of non- or
passive use values into decision-making. Passive use values are, in effect,
a proxy to measure the aggregate value of natural resources over time. If
the passive use values are evaluated over a longer period of time and over
a broader community, they more accurately measure changing preferences.
B. THE SCIENCE AND OBJECTIVES OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEM RIVER
MANAGEMENT

The primary objective of modern river management is the sciencebased practice of adaptive management. Glen Canyon Environmental
Studies ("GCES"), a National Academy of Sciences/National Research
Council committee, provides the scientific basis for the re-operation of the
Glen Canyon Dam to provide for a flow regime that is less environmentally
disruptive and for beach building flood flows which attempt to restore the
sediment balance in the Colorado River through the Grand Canyon.185
After a decade of monitoring, the GCES articulated a possible new
management vision:
A different kind of management principle, which might be called the
principle of naturalness, applies to national parks.
Management is
minimized, and where it must occur, it is directed toward the maintenance
of environmental regime that as nearly as possible resembles the natural or
undisturbed condition of the environment.
It seems unreasonable to
consider the future operation of Glen Canyon Dam without also
considering the principle of naturalness as it might
apply to the Grand Canyon National Park. 186
The non-equilibrium ecology, which rejects the earlier ecological
theory of a balance of nature and the associated romantic idea that nature
should be a place without humans, provides the basis for the vision of
modern river management and theories of biodiversity conservation. In his
path-breaking book, Discordant Harmonies, Daniel Botkin has
"deconstructed" the equilibrium paradigm as a misguided effort to match

184. See DAVID PEARCE ET AL., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC AND
ENVIRONMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD (1990).
185. NATIONAL RES. COUNCIL, DOWNSTREAM: ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF GLEN
CANYON DAM AND THE COLORADO ECOSYSTEM (1999).
186. Id. at 56. (unfortunately, "[t]o date, the Adaptive Management Program has not
produced a scientific and stakeholder-based consensus regarding the desired state of the
ecosystem ....").
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science to theological and scientific visions of a perfect universe."8 7
Botkin's basic argument is that the images of nature that have influenced
ecology are static when in fact the kinds of problems that we face require a
dynamic view of nature. He argues that the dynamic view of nature starts
from the premises that human action is one of the principal forces
operating on ecosystems and that system disturbances are both predictable
and random. 8 8 A new regulatory science, conservation biology,189 is
emerging to deal with the persistent problem of generating scientific
information that can inform management decisions by designing research
agendas tailored toward specific management issues. Examples of specific
management issues include determining the minimum viable habitat for an
endangered species or the disturbance regimen necessary to sustain the
ecosystem. By focusing on the integration and progressive nature of
scientific research, management regimes can adjust to new information and
changed ecological conditions.
Ecosystems are patches or collections of conditions that exist for finite
periods of time. As a leading aquatic ecologist has written, water resource
systems are "inherently variable, patchy, and often require disturbance to
persist." 1" This has three consequences that are partially reflected in the
Glen Canyon Dam experience. The first is that all future management
"Adaptive planning and management invoke a
must be adaptive."'
decision-making process based on trial, monitoring, and feedback" so that
goals can be modified, as necessary, in light of new information.192 The
second is that management objectives, or baselines, must be consistent with
the idea of altered systems. The accelerating interaction between humans
and the natural environment makes it impossible to return to an ideal state
of nature.193 At best, ecosystems can be managed rather than restored or
preserved. Third, all management will be a series of calculated risky
"[N]ature moves and changes and involves risks and
experiments.
uncertainties and ... our own judgments of our actions must be made
against this moving target. ' 94

187. See Botkin, supra note 23.
188. Id.
189. See Noss & COOPERIDER, supra note 27, at 84-86.
190. Meyer, supra note 27, at 78.
191.
COMMITTEE ON RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS, NATIONAL RES. COUNCIL,
RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 357

(1992).
192. Id.
193. The philosophical basis for the new ecology can be found in Bill McKibben's widely
read, The End of Nature, which argues the modern mind separates humanity from nature
and thus, the romantic visions of harmony between humanity and nature are impossible.
See BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (1989); see also Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and
the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325 (1995)

(book review of Jonathan Baert Weiner,
IN OUR TIME (1994)).

194. Botkin, supra note 23, at 190.
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VI. INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL FLOW RESTORATION
EXPERIMENTS
Integration of adaptive management into existing and future
international water regimes will be extremely difficult, but not impossible.
The root of the difficulty is that water management has been traditionally
conceived as part of the process of protecting vested entitlements by
ensuring that they will be satisfied in times of scarcity. Firm allocation
treaties build up strong expectations that existing entitlements will continue
in perpetuity and create strong, and partially legitimate, fears among all
participants that any change would make them worse, not better off. The
continued protection of vested and potential entitlements in international
watercourses must be an essential element of any environmental
management strategy, but protection duties under the Convention, treaties,
and domestic and customary international law should not operate to
preclude the consideration and adoption of innovation management
strategies. Innovation is not necessarily incompatible with the protection of
vested entitlements. This is especially important because in the future, a
major river management task will be the restoration of degraded rivers.
Major river systems such as the Colorado, Columbia, 9 5 Missouri, and Nile
are facing substantial environmental problems due to the construction of
large dams. These projects were built for three primary purposes, water
supply, power, and flood control, but they are now being modified to
satisfy new and additional objectives, primarily environmental and
recreational.' 96 Experiments are now underway on many river systems,
large and small, to restore the system to a baseline that reverses the most
harmful effects of human use and alteration of natural system functions.1 97
These changes can be accommodated with vested entitlements because
it is possible to achieve the objective of the entitlement through new
management regimes that have a risk-sharing component. The rhetoric of
water rights based on priority has obscured the risks inherent in all water
rights and created an unjustified illusion of firm water rights. Ultimately,
water rights can be better understood as a practical, intuitive response to
the seasonable unreliability of supplies. The construction of large carryover storage reservoirs, which reduce but do not eliminate the inherent
risks, has worked to mask these risks. Water rights are subject not only to
the fixed risks of priority but also to the new risks created by new demands
on the system. This is not an argument for wholesale reallocation. It
asserts only that because risk is inherent in water entitlements, there are no
inherent legal barriers to the adoption of management solutions that
equitably reassign the risks of water shortages to accommodate all relevant

195. Literature concerning the principal environmental problem, the loss of historic
salmon runs, is vast. See e.g., Michael C. Blumm, et al., Beyond the Parity Promise:
Struggling to Save the Columbia Basin Salmon in the Mid-1990s, 27 ENVTL. L. 21 (1997);
William Stelle, Jr., Overcoming the Seven Myths of Columbia River Salmon Recovery, 28
ENVTL. L. 493 (1998).
196. See Michael Collier, et al., DAMS AND RIVERS: A PRIMER ON THE DOWNSTREAM
EFFECTS OF DAMS 3 (1996) (U.S.G.S. Circular 1126).
197. See generally RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 189.
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users and nations in a basin. Thus, the focus should be on the actual
expectations that lie behind a use, rather than the perpetual enforcement of
the entitlement, so that alternative ways of satisfying those expectations in
ways that accommodate new uses can be found.'9
The potential to integrate management into existing allocation regimes
and the constraints that property rights-based regimes pose is illustrated by
a number of on-going international and domestic river restoration efforts.
For example, a large-scale systematic experiment is underway in the
Florida Everglades to restore the slow moving, seasonable north-south
sheet flows disrupted by the development of urban areas and agricultural
districts above the Everglades.' 99 The United States and the state of
Florida will spend up to $8 billion dollars over a twenty year period to
recapture and store water diverted from the north-south flow and
discharged into the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. 2°° Another
experiment is underway in California to preserve the fresh-salt water
balance in the San Francisco Bay Delta 211 in a way that engages all
stakeholders in the search for non-zero sum solutions. Further, the
Commission on Environmental Cooperation released its Factual Record on
the under-enforcement of Canadian fish protection legislation by BC
[British Columbia] Hydro on the Upper Columbia River System in June
2000.202

A. THE MURRAY-DARLING BASIN
An important flow maintenance and ecosystem restoration experiment
is underway on Australia's largest river system, the Murray-Darling
Basin.20 3 While the population of the basin is relatively small, it contains
198. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Creation of New Risk Sharing Water Entitlement Regimes:
The Case of the Truckee-CarsonSettlement, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 674 (1999).
199. See William K. Stevens, Putting Things Right in the Everglades, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
13, 1999, at DI.
200. Id.
201. After the 1996 completion of Phase I by the identification of three alternative
restoration and protection strategies, the process progressed to Phase II, the identification of
a preferred alternative. Phase II will end in late 1999 with the preparation of the Final
Programmatic Environmental Impact State/Environmental Impact Report. The Revised
Phase II report outlines the draft preferred alternative. CALFED Bay-Delta Program,
Revised
Phase
1H
Report
(June
1999)
<http://www.calfed.water.ca.gov/adobe_pdf/revised-draft eis-eir>.
Eighteen
characteristics such as in and out of Delta water quality, operational flexibility, fisheries
impacts, and risk to export water supplies were identified to assess three synthesis
alternatives. The Report recommends a preferred alternative, which is the adoption of
adaptive management to implement eight strategies over a 30 year period. Id. at 25, 28.
The eight strategies are: (1) long-term levee protection; (2) a water quality program to make
significant reductions in point and non-point source pollution; (3) ecosystem restoration; (4)
increased water use efficiency among all state water users; (5) the development of "an
active and properly regulated water market which will allow water to move between users;"
(6) locally-led watershed management activities; (7) new storage, including groundwater
options; and (8) a through-Delta conveyance based on the existing Delta configuration. Id.
at 25, 27-28.
202. Commission on Environmental Cooperation, FACTUAL RECORD SEM 97-001 (BC
Aboriginal Fisheries Commission et al, June, 2000).
203. See MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 1998-99 (1999)
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forty-two percent of Australia's agriculture, most of the country's major
24
small inland cities, and the Australian capital territory, Canberra. 0
Australia is a federal state and the Murray-Darling Basin is an interstate
river system.2 °5 The Darling River originates in southern Queensland and
the River Murray and its major tributaries originate in the Snowy
Mountains of New South Wales and Victoria." ° The Darling joins the
Murray near Mildura, Victoria, where the American Chaffee brothers
established an irrigation colony, and empties into the Pacific Ocean near
Adelaide, South Australia." 7 The system has experienced a great deal of
ecosystem degradation, especially salinity, due to diversions and dams. 0
In 1992, the federal government and the basin states agreed to the MurrayDarling Basin Initiative ("Initiative") to conserve the ecosystem of the river
system. 209 The Initiative led to the adoption of the federal-state MurrayBasin Agreement2 10 ("Agreement") and the creation of the Murray-Darling
Basin Commission ("Commission"), a joint federal-state commission
overseen by a federal-state ministerial council. Unlike an interstate
compact in the United States, or an international treaty, the Agreement
imposes much more detailed management duties on the parties and new
agreements constantly amend it. The Agreement both allocates the flow
among the basin states 21I and vests the Commission with the power to
control releases from specified upstream storage facilities.
The
Commission now runs the river, overseen by the ministerial council and a
stakeholder advisory board.21 2
The most important potential international precedent is the
Commission's adoption of a base flow regime and the imposition of the
regime on existing users throughout the basin. The Commission has
initiated a process to set environmental or base flows for ecosystem
restoration based on the impacts of different flows on the riverine
environment.2 13 On developed river basins, the problem with establishing
new flow or hydrographic regimes is that vested rights have been
< http://www.mdbc.gov.au/MDBasin/index.html > [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
204. MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, The Murray-Darling Basin: An Introduction <
http://www.mdbc.gov.au/MDBasin/Introduction/MDBIntroduction.html > ;
MURRAYDARLING
BASIN
COMM'N,
Agriculture
<
http://www.mdbc.gov.au/MDBasin/Resources/Agriculture/Agriculture.html >;
MURRAYDARLING
BASIN
COMM'N,
Detailed
Statistics:
Agriculture
<
http://www.mdbc.gov.au/MDBasin/Detail-Stats/Agriculture.html >.
205. MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, History of the Murray-DarlingBasin Agreement
< http://www.mdbc.gov.au/Initiative/Agreement/History.html >.
206. MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, The Murray-Darling Basin: An Introduction <
http://www.mdbc.gov.au/MDBasin/Introduction/MDB Introduction.html >;
MURRAYDARLING
BASIN
COMM'N,
The
River
Murray
System
<
http://www.mdbc.gov.au/RMS/RMS.html >.
207. Id.
208. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 200, at 19-20, 32-34.
209. Id. at 7; see also Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, June 1992 (with additions to
July 1999), Austl.-N.S.W.-Vict.-S. Austl., <www.mdbc.gov.au>.
210. Murray-DarlingBasin Agreement, supra note 206.
211. Id., pt. X.
212. Id., pts. III & IV.
213. Id., pts. V & VI.
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previously acquired, or at least users claim them. Both the federal and
state governments recognized the need to limit water withdrawals, establish
base flows, and to stabilize and restore productive agricultural areas,
especially those degraded by salinization.214 In 1996, the Commission
announced the Cap, which is the "cornerstone of a number of policies
designed to manage water resources for scarcity: water trading,
environmental flows and the security of property rights." 2" 5 The Cap
imposes yearly diversion limits on the four basin states and the Australian
Capital Territory.21 6 New South Wales agriculture accounts for many of
the stresses on the system, and the Commission imposed a state Cap based
on 1993-94 withdrawal levels. 217 The Caps will vary from year to year
according to the supply. Each state administers the Cap, which will
require aggressive management as agricultural water diversions increase in
both New South Wales and Queensland. 1 8
Australia is prone to prolonged periods of severe drought which
alternate with wet years. 219 Diversions are increasing upstream in
Queensland as well in many of New South Wales inland irrigated
agricultural districts. 220 In 1996-97, three major sub-basins in New South
Wales exceeded the Cap. 22 Achievement of the Cap will require many
innovative management strategies such as conjunctive use of ground and
surface water, an abandonment of the "use it or lose it" administration of
water licenses, and the implementation of an accounting system to balance
water use over a period of time. 2 Still, the Commission predicted that all
states would meet the Caps, except New South Wales.223 Only one basin,
the Lahlan, clearly exceeded the Cap in its first years of implementation,
1997-98, but usage in other major basins is approaching the Cap,
especially if development is allowed to increase. 224 The ability of the Cap
to help restore the Murray-Darling Basin will not be known for years.
However, the initial experience suggests that plans, which first try to
maintain the status quo and then promote gradual and modest rollbacks in
existing uses, can be both fair, efficient, and promote environmental
214. Id.
215. Annual Report 1998-1999, supra note 200, at 24. The ministerial council has
commissioned a five year review of the Cap to "identify any impediments and constraints to
its full operation."
MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, REVIEW OF THE CAP
IMPLEMENTATION 1997-1998, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDIT GROUP (1998)
[hereinafter REVIEW OF THE CAP IMPLEMENTATION].
216. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 200.
217. MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, MURRAY-DARLING BASIN CAP ON DIVERSIONS:
WATER YEAR 1997/98 STRIKING THE BALANCE (1998) [hereinafter MURRAY-DARLING BASIN
CAP ON DIVERSIONS].

218.
219.

Id.
See generally MURRAY-DARLING BASIN COMM'N, WATER AUDIT MONITORING
REPORT 1996/97 (1998).
220. Id. at 11-13, 17-19.
221. Id. at 10.
222. MURRAY-DARLING BASIN CAP ON DIVERSIONS, supra note 214, at 10.
223. Id.
224. Water diversions in the Murrumbidgee Valley are approaching the upper confidence
levels of the Cap irrigation is projected to increase. REVIEW OF THE CAP IMPLEMENTATION,
supra note 212.
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objectives. In major river systems, wasteful agricultural water use and use
in excess of legal entitlements almost always exist. This provides river
managers with some flexibility to experiment without the undue dislocation
of legitimate user expectations.
B. RE-ENGINEERING GLEN CANYON DAM ON THE COLORADO RIVER

Re-engineering international rivers will be especially challenging due
to the high level of scientific, cross-national, and financial cooperation
required; the reluctance of nations to change shared control of
transboundary water; and because new flow regimes may conflict with
entitlements based on prior use established under the equitable
apportionment rules. Although modern international law is moving toward
creating agreements that are open to change, treaties are viewed as eternal
compacts. Efforts to revise the operating regime for Glen Canyon Dam on
the Colorado River, an international river, illustrate that efforts to restore a
shadow of a pre-dam flow on the Colorado are possible, but can be
impeded by the entitlements generated by multiple purpose development.
Re-engineering possibilities exist to improve the Canyon ecosystem, but
resistance exists because they may frustrate the expectations of the basin
generated by the entitlement regime.
The construction of Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado, and its
operation for hydroelectric power generation, has altered the downstream
environment through the Grand Canyon. 225 The net result of the
construction of Glen Canyon Dam and other carry-over storage and
hydroelectric generating dams is that the Colorado has permanently become
an artificial river.226 Ecosystems often require disturbance cycles to sustain
them, and Glen Canyon Dam altered the natural hydrographic of the
Colorado.227 In the. early 1980s, a number of consequences of the
substitution of an artificial disturbance regime began to surface. Beaches
eroded; the endemic fish were jeopardized by the substitution of colder
clear water for the warm, more turbid natural flow regime; and rafting
trips were subjected to pulsating flows from the daily power release cycle.
In 1986, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Western Power Administration
began to collect information about these changes and after initial resistance
agreed to prepare an environmental impact statement. 22' Four National
Academy of Sciences reports assess the policy utility of this research.229
Congress intervened in the process with the passage of the Grand
225. See

PHILIP

184 (1981).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See U.S.

L.

FRADKIN,

DEP'T

OF

A

RIVER No MORE: THE COLORADO RIVER AND THE WEST

INTERIOR,

OPERATION

OF

GLEN

CANYON

DAM,

FINAL

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 73-76 (1995).
229. COMMITTEE TO REV. THE GLEN CANYON ENVTL. STUD., NATIONAL RES. COUNCIL,
RIVER AND DAM MANAGEMENT:

A REVIEW OF THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION'S GLEN

CANYON ENVTL. STUD. 3 (1987); COLORADO RIVER ECOLOGY AND DAM MANAGEMENT 1
(1991); RIVER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE GRAND CANYON x-xi (1996); DOWNSTREAM:
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF GLEN CANYON DAM AND THE COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEM viii

(1999).
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Canyon Protection Act of 1992 ("the Act").23 ° Section 1802 of the Act
requires that the Secretary of the Interior operate the dam in a manner
consistent with the "Law of the River," including the Endangered Species
Act, to "mitigate adverse impacts to, and improve the values for which the
Grand Canyon National Park and the Glen Canyon National Recreation
Area were established, including, but not limited to natural and cultural
resources and visitor use." 23 1 The Act is a direct outcome of the
identification of the need for a different release pattern from the Glen
Canyon Dam both to build beaches and to retard beach erosion. In 1990,
the GCES scientists proposed a research flow program to test the impacts
of less fluctuation and the spring beach building pulses on the corridor.232
Initially, the Department of Interior opposed the legislation because the
research flows had not been implemented and evaluated, but this opposition
ended after Bureau of Reclamation and the Western Area Power
Administration agreed to an experimental interim flow regime in late
1991.233
Research indicates that ecosystem management does not necessarily
require a fundamental change in reservoir operations and thus may not be
inconsistent with equitable entitlements. When the GCES began, many
scientists and others thought that the Glen Canyon Dam had trapped the
sediment necessary to sustain the beaches of the Canyon.234 Sophisticated
sediment transport research done by the United States Geological Service
("USGS") and other federal agencies demonstrated that tributaries entering
the mainstem below Glen Canyon Dam contain a sufficient amount of sand
to maintain beaches and backwaters. 235 The problem was not the mass
balance of sand in the system but the way in which it moved post-dam.236
The alteration of the pre-dam hydrographic eliminated seasonable floods,
except when the reservoir could not contain the run-off, and replaced them
with a combination of steady and fluctuating flows produced by the
generation of peaking power that eroded the beaches.237 The scientists
recommended controlled floods (or beaching building flows, as the Bureau
of Reclamation prefers to call them) and reduced ramping rates (the decline
in the rate discharge from the turbines) to reduce beach loses.238 The
Bureau of Reclamation now operates Glen Canyon Dam to limit upramp
rates to 4,000 c.f.s. per hour and maximum allowable releases to 25,000
c.f.s. with an understanding that flows above 20,000 c.f.s. will be
infrequent.239 In 1996, the Bureau of Reclamation released a beach
240
building flood flow, and the studies on the effects of the flow continue.
230.

Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4699 (1992).

231.

Id. § 1802.
See U.S. DEP'T
Id.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

OF INTERIOR,

supra note 225.

DEP'T OF INTERIOR,

supra note 225..

Id.
Id.

Id.
See U.S.
Id.
Id.

Id.
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Historically, the "Law of the Colorado River," which is a permanent
inter-basin mass allocation scheme, did not include the idea that the flow of
the river was a use to be protected. Both the Upper and Lower Basins are
entitled to 7.5 million acre-feet per year and Mexico is entitled to 1.5
million acre-feet per year.241 Subsequent legislation, Supreme Court
decrees, and a compact fix individual state shares. Large mainstem and
tributary storage reservoirs secure the delivery obligations of the Upper
Basin. States and other water right holders view any change in the
operating rules for these dams and reservoirs as violations of the "Law of
the Colorado River" due to the potential decrease in carry-over storage
although the mass allocations remain unpaired. There is a need to
recognize that all entitlements have an element of risk and that adaptive
management can act as a risk minimization mechanism.
C. RESTORING THE COLORADO RIVER DELTA
The efforts to restore the Colorado River Delta ("Delta") illustrate the
potential role that the Convention could play in reinforcing the nascent
restoration regime. Along with the Nile River, the Delta is one of the
great desert estuaries in the world.242 Today, the Delta's 150,000 acres are
only a remnant of its original 1,930,000-acre area.24 3 Nonetheless, the
Delta remains an important biodiversity reserve for a large number of
endangered and non-endangered species, as the Mexican government
recognized in 1993 when it designated the Biosphere Reserve of the Upper
Gulf of California and the Colorado River Delta. 244 The nub of the
problem is that the Colorado is almost entirely diverted and consumed in
the both United States and Mexico by the time it empties into the Delta.
Thus, the area receives insufficient, unreliable flows. Today, only twenty
to twenty-five percent of the Colorado's flow reaches the Delta, and this
water comes from flood releases, return irrigation flows, and municipal
wastewater. 245 Hoover and Glen Canyon Dams severely damaged the
ecosystem because no freshwater reached the Delta in the years required to
fill the reservoirs.24 6 Since Glen Canyon Dam was filled in 1981, the Delta
is slowly rebounding in spite of erratic
flood flows and the poor quality of
247
much of the water that reaches it.
Experts estimate that the Delta could still survive "through some level

241. See Meyers, supra note 63; see also, Paul L. Bloom, Law of the River: A Critique
of an Extraordinary Legal System, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER 139 (Gary
Weatherford & F. Lee Brown eds., 1983) (providing an introduction to the "law of the
river").
242. CARLOS VALDES-CASILLAS ET AL., INFORMATION DATABASE AND LOCAL OUTREACH
PROGRAM FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE HARDY RIVER WETLANDS,
RIVER DELTA, BAJA CALIFORNIA AND SONORA, MEXICO (North

Conservation Council, 1998).
243. DANIEL F. LUECKE ET

LOWER COLORADO

American Wetland

AL., A DELTA ONCE MORE: RESTORING RIPARIAN AND
WETLAND HABITAT IN THE COLORADO RIVER DELTA 1 (1999).

244.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at
at
at
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2.
1.
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of protection for flows that are presently occurring but are not

mandated" 24 ' because "large, continuous flows of water in the river are not
necessary to support the remaining delta riparian habitats.,

24 9

The Delta

needs a scheme of perennial flows of 32,000 acre-feet per year and flood
or pulse flows of 260,000 acre-feet approximately every four years.250
Flood flows occur as part of the variable water supply of the region. 5
The real problem is how to maintain flood flows in periods of prolonged
drought.
Water supplies during prolonged drought can come from

reservoir releases consistent with the Bureau of Reclamation's annual
operating plan, the purchase of compact entitlements from states with a
surplus, or the purchase of existing water rights.
The federal government controls all water stored in the Lower
Colorado mainstem dams. 2 Thus, the first option would ultimately
require federal authorization and an amendment to the 1944 Water
Treaty. 5 3 In effect, this would be a re-negotiation of the 1922 and 1948
compacts, which makes the task difficult to accomplish, since the 1922
Compact allocated the Colorado in perpetuity.
The Colorado is fully
allocated, if not over-allocated, among the seven basin states and between
the United States and Mexico. As is much of water allocation, the "Law
of the Colorado River" is a hypothetical risk allocation scheme in a worstcase scenario- prolonged extreme drought. The existing treaty is as rigid
a risk allocation scheme as exists in the world and contains no provision

for any permanent dedication of water to the Delta.255 Mexico is further
handicapped in any efforts to take exclusive responsibility for the Delta
because it is entitled to only 1.5 million acre-feet compared to the 15
million acre-feet that the two United States basins share. 256 The Delta gets
only what Mexico does not use or returns. However, the Glen Canyon
"beach building flow" release experiment, described in the previous
248.

Id. at 12.

249.

LUECKE ET AL.,

supra note 240, at 20.

250. Id. at 42.
251. Id.
252. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 546-47 (1963), supplemental decree, 376
U.S. 340, 340 (1964).
253. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 113.

254.

LUECKE ET AL.,

supra note 237, at 12.

255. The precarious position of the Delta is reflected in Mexico's comments to the final
Department of Interior rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,006 (1999) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt.
414), which allows voluntary transfers of surplus Colorado River entitlements among
Lower Basin states. Mexico expressed concerns that the storage of surplus entitlements
prior to transfer would result in a 1% annual decrease of the total quantity of water
projected to reach Mexico between 1999 and 2015. The Department of Interior responded
that there could be a decrease in flood control releases reaching the Delta and stood on the
legal position that "[a]t present, Reclamation has no authority or discretion over the type of
use or location of use of Colorado River water once it reaches Mexico." 64 Fed. Reg.
58,992-58,993 (1999).
256. Mexico's share is a first priority because Article X of the 1944 Water Treaty
guarantees her this amount subject to an "extraordinary drought" or serious damage to
upstream irrigation systems. See Meyers & Noble, supra note 63. Article Ill(c) of the
Colorado River Compact provides that any (then) future Mexican allocation be supplied (1)
from any surplus waters and, "if such surplus shall prove insufficient" (2) the deficiency
should be borne equally by the two basins. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 (1973).
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section Part VIII.B, suggests that a schedule of flow releases need not be
constant or permanent and thus "interruptible" restoration flows can be
consistent with the satisfaction of all entitlements. Nevertheless, some
"safety net" must be created to deal with sustained droughts when no
temporary surplus exists and the ecosystem has exceeded its capacity to
rebound from a period of water deprivation.
Voluntary transfers from existing agricultural uses to Delta
conservation and restoration may prove feasible. However, the real and
imagined legal barriers are considerable and thus the transaction costs of
any transfer would be high. Water marketing has been proposed as a
restoration strategy because transfers in treaty states may not require a
compact or treaty amendment.257 Economists and many western water
critics have long criticized western water law because it ignores higher,
alternative values of water. Critics assert that too much water is used to
grow surplus or low-valued crops, too much water is used in a wasteful
manner, and that increased transfers are desirable. Prior appropriation
allocates the risks of shortages by a simple principle-priority of use. The
question is how flexible the water transfer system will be in the future.
Two sets of problems, one institutional, the other distributional, must be
addressed.
The first question is whether water users will respond
sufficiently to market incentives. The second and more difficult question is
whether the redistributions commanded by the market are fair and
consistent with ecosystem sustainability in both the short and long run. 5 8
International water transfers face a number of barriers that differ in
degree, if not in kind, from those faced by domestic water transfers. The
first barrier is conceptual or physiological. In order for water to be
transferred, it must be perceived as a commodity. Domestic legal systems
that allow the creation of semi-exclusive water rights solve this problem.
Once a property right to a share of a resource exists, the major step toward
commodification has been taken. Alienability is a standard (but not
inevitable) attribute of property rights. The first problem with cross-border
water transfers is that many countries will exhibit a dual attitude toward
water. Water will be recognized as a commodity within, but not outside,
the countries' borders. Countries will invoke state sovereignty as the basis
for the right to keep water out of the market. Canada has taken this
position with respect to its waters as a result of the possibility of the
transport of bulk water from the Great Lakes and other waters for resale in
arid countries. Classic international law gives a country complete control
over the development and use of its resources so long as the country does
not cause or allow transboundary pollution. No dormant commerce clause
exists in international law that requires a country to share its resources with
other countries. The only possible check on state sovereignty are GATT or
among Canada, Mexico and the United States, the NAFTA.2 9 However,
257. See David J. Guy, When the Law Dulls the Edge of Chance: Transferring Upper
Basin Water to the Lower Colorado River Basin, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 25, 36 (1991).
258. Tarlock, supra note 111, at 173-78; A. Dan Tarlock, Western Water Law, Global
Warming, and Growth Limitations, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 979, 998-99 (1991).
259. See supra note 104.
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GATT and NAFTA only embody the principle that if a country decides to
turn a natural resource into a commodity, it must permit trade in a nondiscriminatory manner. Thus, the issue is political, not legal.
The dichotomy between water as a sovereign resource of national
patrimony and a commodity runs through water allocation agreements.
Transfers of compact surplus entitlements between the Upper and Lower
Basin and among Lower Basin states have been proposed to accommodate
new environmental and urban needs. In 1999, the Bureau of Reclamation
authorized voluntary transfers of surplus entitlements among Lower Basin
states,2' but the idea has been fiercely opposed by many stakeholders in
the Basin as inconsistent with the "Law of the River." Articles 3 and 8 of
the Convention have been cited for the proposition that the Compact
precludes inter-state, inter-basin, or international water transfers. 261 Article
3(a) gives each basin a perpetual right to "the exclusive beneficial
consumptive use" of 7,500,000 acre-feet and Article VIII provides that all
rights, except 5,000,000 acre feet of present perfected rights, shall be
satisfied "solely from the water apportioned to that Basin in which they are
situated. ' 262 Too much is read into these words. The provisions were
primarily intended to preserve the Upper Basin's future rights against the
faster growing Lower Basin. In addition, the provisions were intended to
block an appropriation of surplus waters beyond those expressly allocated
by the compact and to limit any future Lower Basin rights to the 7,500,000
acre-feet plus the hypothetical 1,000,000 acre-feet surplus.
These
provisions should be waivable by the intended beneficiaries if no other state
right holders or a federal interest is injured.
The Colorado River Basin states and stakeholders must ultimately come
to the realization that the scientific and economic assumptions behind the
Colorado River compacts must be adjusted to the changing demands on the
river both in the United States and Mexico. The 1944 Water Treaty
between Mexico and the United States has been amended to incorporate
salinity levels into the Mexican delivery obligation 21 setting the precedent
to address environmental problems on the Mexican reach of the Colorado.
Voluntary transfers among basin states and between the United States and
Mexico are a fair way to address environmental problems. 2 6 Any water
transfer must be consistent with the "Law of the River," federal
Reclamation law, and state transfer law. 265 The Convention cannot
overcome the many legal obstacles to an international transfer, but its new
focus on the protection of aquatic water quality and ecosystem integrity
suggests that international water marketing consistent with its objectives
should be presumed legal under the domestic law of the transferring nation.
260. 64 Fed. Reg. 59,006 (1999) (to be codified as 43 C.F.R. pt. 414).
261. International Watercourses Convention, supra note 1, arts. III & VIII, 36 I.L.M. at
704-07.
262. Id.
263. International Boundary and Water Commission, Minute 242, 12 I.L.M. 1105
(1973).
264. See DALE PONTIUS, COLORADO RIVER BASIN STUDY 24 (Western Water Pol'y Rev.
Comm'n 1997).
265. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1983).
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VII. CONCLUSION
International water law is in the middle of a paradigm shift from
multiple-use to environmentally sustainable development and management
to promote aquatic biodiversity. Principles developed between the 1972
Stockholm and 1992 Rio de Janeiro United Nations environmental
conferences provide the legal norms for environmentally sustainable river
management. Both science and ethics must be applied to the international
law of river use and management to adapt international water law to
ecosystem protection.
Historically, post-project damage payments or
minor project modifications in the name of mitigation have dealt with
environmental problems. In contrast, international environmental law
increasingly approaches pollution and environmental destruction from the
front end through the precautionary or prevention principle. States are
encouraged to prevent environmental destruction by addressing the
problems before, not after, development occurs through cooperative, ongoing management regimes. This approach is partially reflected in the
Convention and the ICJ Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project decision but needs
further development.

